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The thesis examines the motives of people in Arkhangelsk (Russia) to take part in the 
10 December 2011 protest which emerged after the Duma elections. The objective of the 
research is to find out what motivated people in Arkhangelsk to take part in the protest (i.e. 
what kind of drivers triggered them to participate). The study draws on theory of spatial 
analyses of protest under the Russia’s hybrid regime, which emphasizes local socioeconomic 
and political conditions as influential factors in formation of nature of protest. 
The results of the qualitative research indicate that protestors in Arkhangelsk were not 
only concerned with possible falsifications of Duma election results when they engaged into 
the protest. Due to specific local environments, protesters might also put forward demands 
based on discontent with socioeconomic and political situation in Arkhangelsk. The findings 
suggest that protest in Arkhangelsk was not purely political but combined traits of social and 
economic protest as well. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
After almost ten years of stable development in Russia, which replaced “wild and evil” 
1990s1 – transition period from communism to capitalism - social tension across the country 
had started to increase again by the end of 2000s (Berdy, 2010). The Great Recession of 2008 
is often considered as a starting point which gave impetus to worsening of socio-economic 
situation in the country, which, in its turn, undermined credit of trust towards current authority 
among ordinary citizens (Khanin & Fomin, 2013, pp. 12-13). Trends connected with pressure 
on democratic institutes in the second half of 2000s in Russia accelerated growth of discontent 
with political environment in the state as well. The protest wave in December 2011 in Russia 
was one of the most significant demonstrations of the situation in Russian society at that time. 
One of the protests was held in Arkhangelsk city, 10 December 2011. 
 
1.1 Growth of protest mood in Arkhangelsk, Russia 
Arkhangelsk was founded in 1584. It is situated in the European North of Russia on the 
territory of “Belomorjye” (the White Sea area) with population about 350 thousand inhabitants 
(The official tourism information portal of the Arkhangelsk Region, 2010). The city is an 
administrative centre of the same name region and one of the biggest in the Arctic area at all 
(Russian cities today, 2014). 
The Arkhangelsk region is traditionally considered to be a zone with relatively social 
stability (Chuvashova, 2013, p. 40). However, since 2009 protest activity in the region has been 
increasing. At this period there was a fall in the rate of industrial growth, increase of 
unemployment rate, reduction in demand for the products of timber industry complex in the 
area and so on. According to the research of “Obshestvennoe mnenie” (“Public opinion”) 
polling organization, 73% of local inhabitants were “dissatisfied with socio-economic 
conditions in the region” in 2009 (Chuvashova, 2013, p. 40). In the subsequent three years 
(2009-2011) residents of Arkhangelsk and other small cities in the region experienced a few 
waves of protests. In particular, the biggest of them were the “protest of doctors” in May and 
September 2009; the protest against growth of tariffs of housing and communal services in 
February, March, and April 2010; the “Antigoverner” protest in April and May 2011 and other. 
None were well organized and did not exceed thousand participators (Chuvashova, 2011, p. 2). 
                                                          
1 “Wild and evil 1990s” is a journalist cliché characterizing period of post-Soviet Russia in 1990s and associated 
with: radical market reforms (“shock therapy”), comprehensive privatization of state property, development of 
democratic institutes, spread of banditry etc. 
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Main demands of all those protests were generally associated with improvement of socio-
economic conditions. As most of these demands were ignored, from 2010 political claims 
became more and more loud as well. Particularly, protestors urged to fire regional chief leaders, 
to improve authority monitoring system and so on (ibid., pp. 2-7).   
Such state of affairs manifested itself in record reduction of voters for the current ruling 
party “United Russia” on 4 December 2011 Duma election2. Compared to the previous one in 
2007, the percentage of people in the Arkhangelsk region who voted for this party was halved: 
from 56% in 2007 to 30% in 2011. There was no any other area in Russia (except Yaroslavkaya 
Oblast region) with such a low support of the “United Russia” party. 
However, many representatives of local population were not satisfied even with such a 
result of elections. In addition, the protest researcher N. Chuvashova (2013) notes that citizens 
had “suspicion of manipulation of votes in 4 December 2011 Duma elections” (Chuvashova, 
2013, p. 4). As a result, large-scale protest movement in entire Russia including the 
Arkhangelsk region emerged: more than two thousand people took part on the 10 December 
protest in Arkhangelsk. According to the official reports, protestors (most of whom were young 
people) demanded to declare honest figures of the elections, to liberate electoral legislation, to 
fire the chief of Central Electoral Commission V. Churov, governor of the region I. Mikhalchuk 
and prime-minister V. Putin (Krasnoe TV, 2011; Chuvashova, 2013, p. 44). The movement 
itself was well-organized by representatives of the local political parties (mainly, by 
communists and social democrats) and civil society (non-profit-making organizations and 
unions). Due to a large scale and level of organization, Norwegian journalist R. Andersen called 
that movement “Snørevolusjonen” (“snow revolution”) (Krasnoe TV, 2011). Noteworthy, that 
factually none of the protesters’ demands was satisfied except voluntary-compulsory 
resignation of governor I. Mikhalchuk in January 2012. 
 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
The main standpoint of the present thesis is that understanding of peoples’ participation 
in protest is closely connected with examination of their first-hand experience. The study seeks 
to achieve this by giving priority to first person accounts emphasizing actors which, as the 
researcher of protests in modern Russia M. Mamonov (2013) notes, “were ignored in most of 
the studies dedicated to the December 2011 protests in Russia” (Mamonov, 2013, p. 379). 
                                                          
2 Duma (or State Duma) is the lower legislative house of the Russian Federation 
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This study seeks to bring focus on the viewpoints of several protesters in Arkhangelsk 
on 10 December 2011 protest in which they took part. The research seeks to provide insights 
on a few protestors’ perspectives in order to get deep, not aggregate data. Referring to the 
protestors’ reflections, the study seeks to create fuller and better understanding of the 10 
December protest in Arkhangelsk in general, especially taking into account that only several 
small studies in regards to this protest were done so far. 
Based on context, the main research question of the present thesis is: what made 
people in Arkhangelsk take part in the protest. In other words, I would like to find out what 
motivated them to be involved into the 10 December rally. 
In order to achieve my aim, I use theoretical findings of T. Lankina and A. Voznaya 
who studied nature of protests in contemporary Russia. Having studied reasons of protests 
across Russia in the period from 2007 to 2012, these two researches came to the conclusion 
that local political and socioeconomic conditions affect mostly type of demands protestors have 
towards authorities. In other words, these environments are crucial in forming of nature of 
protest in particular region3. 
I use their findings as a starting point in my thesis trying to apply them to the format of 
my work. Admitting that the formal cause of all December protests across Russia was similar 
(people’s discontent with falsification of 2011 Duma elections results), I hypothesize that local 
socioeconomic and political environments might form some specific additional demands 
among protestors towards authorities in every region where protests occurred. 
 
Figure 1. Spread of December 2011 protests on the territory of Russia4 
                                                          
3 Detailed description of A. Voznaya and T. Lankina’s work is presented in Theoretical Foundation chapter 
4 The map is taken from: http://www.russia-ukraine-travel.com/images/map-russia-roads-rail.gif; red “protest” 
spots mark the protests where number was abt. 1000 people and more 
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It means that, except formal cause connected with falsifications, protestors in different 
regions of Russia might have other reasons to participate (reasons connected with local 
environments of the respective region). Such an assumption is associated with the fact that 
Russia, as the economic geographer N. Zubarevitch (2011) points out, is “too big territorially... 
extremely multiple and diverse politically, socially, and culturally” (Zubarevitch, 2011). It 
means that people protesting in European North of Russia might have other reasons to protest 
compared to people who protested in the central part of the state since local conditions differ 
much from one region to another.  
Thus, in my case, trying to understand what motivated people in Arkhangelsk to take 
part in the December protest, I assume that for some people there might be other triggers except 
formal protest cause connected with falsification of Duma elections’ results. Based on my 
empirical data and theoretical foundation, I would like to find out to what degree local 
socioeconomic and political conditions were influential (if they were at all) as triggers to 
protest for some protestors in Arkhangelsk in 2011.  
 
1.3 Finding my thesis 
My desire to study 10 December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk appeared a while after 
the event. At that time I was third year student in Northern Arctic Federal University (NArFU) 
in Arkhangelsk, Russia who studied “International relations and regional studies”. In other 
words, I was a witness of that protest which was, in fact, the biggest one in the modern history 
of the city. As a native Arkhangelsk resident, I was extremely amazed with scale of it and how 
much people in the city (not only protestors) were angry with situation in the area and state in 
general. I remember that my relatives and acquaintances’ angriness was not only connected 
with information that electoral results could be falsified but with worsening of socioeconomic 
situation and anti-democratic changes in political system of Russia which continued in the state 
at that time. Therefore, when after sometime I started to read reflections from national and 
foreign mass media and from the researchers about December protests in Russia, I could not 
agree completely with their conclusions regarding causes of these protests5. The authors of 
most of the works I had read underlined that, generally, the December protests across Russia 
were very similar, triggered by one factor (falsifications). It meant that people had same claims 
                                                          






towards government in every region in Russia. Even at that time I was rather skeptical about 
such a generalized approach thinking that specific environment of Arkhangelsk made protest 
so big. If everything was about falsification why didn’t people in Arkhangelsk protest, then, in 
2007 or 2003 when there were other Duma elections and there were evidences about electoral 
fraud as well (Centre for the study of public policy, 2015)? Why people in Arkhangelsk were 
so angry right at that time (December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk, as it was mentioned, was 
the biggest in history of the city in last several decades and one of the most wide scale protests 
compared to ones in other parts of the country)? 
Having these questions in my mind at that time, I formulated my provisional hypothesis 
that local situation in every specific region influenced much on protestors’ claims and, 
consequently, on nature of protest. However, since I had already chosen my thesis topic I could 
not study nature of 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk as the N(A)rFU student. 
In 2014 I became a master student of the “Peace studies” program in the University of 
Tromsø and decided to come back to examination of this topic. I found it relevant to my 
program since it touches upon such issues as “nature of protest”, “protest as a form of political 
participation”, “democracy development” and other issues which are much focused in Peace 
studies.  
In the beginning of my work, I had an assumption that uniqueness of the Arkhangelsk 
protest was connected with not only internal but external factors as well, for example, with 
relative closeness of the city to Western Europe and apartness from the centre. I assumed that 
those factors, in connection with worsening of socioeconomic situation in the city, resulted in 
such a big protest in Arkhangelsk.  
However, after the fieldwork in summer 2015, where I interviewed some Arkhangelsk 
protestors and wanted to find out what persuaded people to take part in protest, I decided to 
stress on political and socioeconomic factors only. From the answers of the informants I caught 
out that internal environment of the region (local political and socioeconomic conditions) was 
most significant in forming of people’s claims towards government on that protest. At the same 
time, external factors were not so relevant for the interviewees as triggers to protest. 
Consequently, I needed some concrete theoretical foundation for my new understanding of 
work which I found in the theory of A. Voznaya and T. Lankina regarding protest trends in 
Russia’s regions. It focuses, as it was said, on examination of local political and socioeconomic 
environments as most influential factors in forming of nature of protest. I found their approach 
relevant to my work and decided to use it as a theoretical base.   
6 
 
Thus, by the autumn 2015, based on Voznaya and Lankina’s study and my empirical 
data, I formulated the current main hypothesis of the thesis in a form in which it is now. It 
sounds as follows: formal main cause of the 10 December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk might 
coincide with the main cause of the December protests in other parts of the state (people’s 
discontent with falsifications of Duma election results). At the same time, due to specific local 
political and socioeconomic situation, protestors in Arkhangelsk might have other different to 
other regions’ claims towards authorities. Understanding of drivers which could affect people’s 
motivation to participate in the Arkhangelsk protest is something I focus on in the present 
thesis. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The present thesis is divided into six chapters. The following chapter is devoted to more 
detailed focus on the wave of protest in 2011 from general perspective and background 
information about situation in Russia right before the studied events. In the chapter 3 the 
theoretical foundation of the thesis is presented. Chapter 4 discusses and reflects the 
methodological issues of the study. In the Chapter 5 data presentation and analyses are 

















Chapter 2. Protest in contemporary Russia 
 
The second chapter focuses on presenting briefly nature and changes of protest activity 
in modern Russia, stressing December 2011 wave of protests, its roots and consequences. 
 
2.1 From 1990s to the end of 2000s 
Protest as a phenomenon of the contemporary Russian political and social reality 
emerged in massive and opened forms rather recently. 
In the beginning, this new type of political practice played role as a dissident movement 
under the democratic slogans against economic stagnation and political demagogy of the Soviet 
authorities. Emergence of such movement was allowed by the highest elite of the Communist 
Party in the middle of 1980s within the framework of “Perestroika” (“restructuring policy”) 
with corresponding slogans: “for democratization!”, “for pluralism, and publicity in state!” and 
so on. Being inspired with such slogans, Russian intellectuals, mainly, became key members 
of protests at that time (Pratsko & Sphak, 2013, p. 23). 
The protests after the collapse of USSR in 1990s were much larger at their scale, type 
of participants and content. With enactment of new Constitution in 1993, the right to protest 
was secured in the main law of the newly formed country. It was fixed in the articles 23, 30, 
31, 37, and 45 that person may not just protect his rights by any legal means but express protest 
in specific forms: meetings, demonstrations, marches, strikes, picketing (ibid., p. 24).   
 In general, a protest movement in 1990s was a reaction of masses in relation to results 
of inconsistent and contractionary state policy which resulted in huge fall in living standards 
among majority of Russian population in comparison to the Soviet period. This is the reason 
why the protest movement in Russia in 1990s is often called “nostalgic” (Vasilchenko, 2015, 
p. 40). Such state of affairs provoked citizens to defend their vital interests in form of protest 
which, consequently, led to the widescale meetings, marches, demonstrations, strikes, railways 
blocking etc. across the country. An image of the protestor was associated with middle or old-
aged person and representatives of most unprotected socio-demographic layers (ibid., p. 40). 
Initially, all those actions were just a form of citizens’ reaction on the negative consequences 
of the implemented “market reforms”. Only gradually by the beginning of 21st century, the 
protest movement in Russia got stable traits and status of almost natural companion of political 
reality (Pratsko & Shpak, 2013, p. 2).  
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Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in the beginning of 2000s was optimistically perceived 
by majority of Russian population. His image, as a representative of security forces, was 
associated with new historical stage in Russia which was in need with, as Russian philosopher 
E. Sheshtopal (2012) calls it, “strong-arm leader… [who may help] to stabilize consequences 
of chaos and devastation of 1990s” (Shestopal, 2012, p. 97). Background of such positive 
perception was growth of oil prices which let country to get excess profit and stabilize 
socioeconomic environment inside the state. All these factors resulted in decrease of number 
of protests across Russia in the first half of 21st century. 
At the same time, in the beginning of 2000s new trends in the Russian reality developed 
which affected nature of protests in the country further. While the first decade after the collapse 
of USSR in Russia was associated with development of democratic institutes, in 2000s reverse 
tendencies started to spread. It was especially much noticeable in the political sphere and 
manifested in, for example, “verticalization” of power (the alignment of the system of 
management in which, practically, every official is accountable to the president), growing 
pressure on the Parliament opposition, gradual merging of ruling “pro-Putin” party “United 
Russia” and government apparatus etc. (Sergeev, 2013, p. 130). All that resulted in growth of 
peoples’ skepticism and disappointment towards democratic institutes (and especially, 
electoral ones) as tool to influence on situation in the country. 
One of the consequences of such state of affairs was emergence and rise of non-
parliamentary opposition in the middle of 2000s which was dissatisfied with trends in political 
sphere of Russia. Representatives of this opposition started to organize protests across all 
regions of Russia to express this discontent. Unlike 1990s, when protestors were mainly 
triggered by their difficult socioeconomic situation, in the middle of 2000s political issues were 
put on agenda as well. These movements were very different in their claims: from radical left-
winged organizations (such as “Vanguard of the Red youth”) to moderate ones (“Solidarity”, 
“United Civil Front” and other). These organizations created coalitions with their aims and 
demands to authorities and organized protest events across entire state.  
In particular, in the period from 2005 to 2010, the biggest coalitions were “Other 
Russia” and “Strategy 31” which had sophisticated system of management throughout the 
country and organized rallies in many regions of Russia, protesting against urgent political 
issues. It should be noted that all marches, strikes and meetings carried out by these coalitions 
caused severe reaction of the authorities: almost every action was dispersed by police and 
participants were often detained and were prosecuted for administrative items. However, all of 
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the protests organized by these coalitions during that period didn’t exceed 3000 people, even 
in the biggest cities of Russia (ibid., p. 131). 
Social protests at that time were less widescale, more spontaneous and less organized. 
In the first decade of 2000s people, as a rule, organized small protests in defence of housing 
rights, the preservation of social benefits and the environment (ibid., p. 132). 
 
2.2 December 2011 protests across Russia 
2.2.1 Preconditions of the protests  
By the beginning of 2011 several opinion poll centers had marked growth in protest 
potential among Russians. It was expressed, in particular, in trust decline to president D. 
Medvedev, prime-minister V. Putin, and the ruling party “United Russia”. The situation 
became more complicated due to decline in living standards in Russia in last several years. 
Finally, it was stressed in the opinion poll report that forthcoming Duma election in December 
would be turning-point if results of election would not fit the expectations of citizens. Such 
situation, in turn, could result in the recordly large crisis in the Russian society in the last 20 
years (ibid., p. 132).  
The election environment in the months leading up to the December 2011 Duma vote 
appeared to indicate increased public discontent with the current political system dominated by 
V. Putin. According to the July 2011 opinion survey by the Russian “Levada Center” polling 
organization, 53% of informants considered that the forthcoming Duma election in December 
would be “an imitation of an election and seats in the State Duma will be distributed as the 
authorities wish,” and 59% of informants agreed with a statement that the election was a 
“struggle of bureaucratic clans for access to the state budget,” rather than a free and fair election 
(Nichol, 2011, p. 2). Analyst A. Kolesnikov argued that D. Medvedev was the symbol of 
modernization, and that when V. Putin announced in September 2011 that he would re-assume 
the presidency, the public became more discontented with the basic authoritarianism of the 
political system since “decision was made without asking of voters” (ibid., p. 2). 
As an election day neared, Russian officials became more concerned that the ruling 
“United Russia” party, which had held most of the seats in the outgoing Duma, was rapidly 
losing popularity among population. According to some observers, Russian authorities, in an 
attempt to prevent losses at the polls, not only used their positions to campaign for the “United 
Russia” party but also planned ballotbox stuffing and other illicit means to retain a majority of 
seats for the “United Russia”. In addition, president D. Medvedev and prime-minister V. Putin 
10 
 
had increasingly criticized election monitoring carried out by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and insisted on decrease of the number of OSCE observers. 
Besides, authorities moved against Russian non-governmental monitoring group, Golos, to 
discourage its coverage of the electoral process. J. Nichol (2011), American specialist in 
Russian Affairs, points out that “according to the OSCE’s preliminary report on the results of 
the election, the close linkage between Russian government and the ruling party, the refusal to 
register political parties, the pro-government prejudgment of the electoral commissions and 
most Mass media, ballot-box stuffing and other forms of manipulation of the vote marked the 
4 December 2011 Duma election as not free and fair” (Nichol, 2011, p. 4). Monitoring group 
“Golos” reported that it had short-term observers in forty regions of Russia that visited more 
than four thousand polling stations. Golos, in its report, drew a conclusion that the election was 
characterized by “considerable violations of many crucial voting procedures” (ibid., p. 4). It 
argued that some political parties had been prevented from forming and taking part in the 
electoral run, that electoral commissions had been packed with authorities representatives 
lacking knowledge of electoral procedures, and that some officials openly campaigned for 
“United Russia” as part of their duties. Nichol notes that Golos observers reported examples 
“in which absentee ballots appeared to be abused, groups appearing to be transported from 
polling place to polling place to vote repeatedly, folded or even tied batches of votes were seen 
in the ballot boxes, and the counting of votes appeared to violate procedures” (ibid., p. 5). 
Therefore, when the results reported by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) were 
announced they were met with scepticism by Russian public. According to the CEC, “United 
Russia” lost 77 of the 315 seats it held since 2007, but it still retained over one half of the seats 
(238 out of 450) in Parliament which meant that the “UR” party, as well as after previous Duma 
Election in 2007 no longer needed to seek accommodation with the three other Parliament 
parties (“LDPR” party, “CPRF” party, “Fair Russia” party) that won seats in order to pass 
favoured laws (ibid., p. 1).  
The day after the election, about 5,000 protesters rallied in Moscow against what they 
viewed as an unfair election. When some of them started an unsanctioned march towards the 
Central Electoral Commission, police severely dispersed them; hundreds of participants were 
detained. Protest attempts the next two nights were suppressed (ibid., p. 7). 
On 10 December 2011, demonstrations under the slogan “For honest elections!” were 





Table 1. The biggest protests in Russia, December 20116 
 
City Number of 
participants 
Date Protesters per. 
capita 
Moscow 85 000 – 15 0000 10 December  0,0074 
Novosibirsk abt.  6000 10 December 0,0038 
Ekaterinburg abt.  5000 10 December 0,0036 
Tomsk abt.  4000 10 December 0,0070 
Samara abt.  4000 24 December 0,0034 
Arkhangelsk abt.  2500 10 December  0,0071 
Volgograd abt. 2000 10 December 0,0020 
Izhevsk abt. 2000 24 December 0,0031 
 
In Moscow, the crowd was estimated by the police at about 25,000 (other estimates 
were up to 150 000), one of the largest such demonstrations in years. Police presence was 
massive but there were few if any detentions. At the rally, there was announced a list of 
demands which included the resignation of the CEC head (V. Churov), release of those 
detained for protesting and other “political prisoners,” registration of previously banned parties, 
and new Duma elections. In some other cities, the protests were broken up by police and 
demonstrators were harshly dispersed (Sergeev, 2013, p. 133).  
The Russian protest researcher S. Sergeev (2013) notes that 2011 December protests 
across Russia had one common character trait. All of them were, in the main, organized not by 
opposing to the “United Russia” political parties but mainly by civil activists and 
representatives of non-parliamentary opposition who regardless their political views worked 
very cohesively together. This is why December protests are usually called “pro-democratic”: 
participators could have different political views but all of them, according to Sergeev, were 
united and inspired by idea of Russian democratisation (Sergeev, 2013, p. 133). However at 
the same time he admits that in order to explain such a large scale of December protests 
throughout the country it is necessary to study every single protest separately since it helps “to 
avoid unnecessary general conclusions” (ibid., p. 133). Besides, another character trait of the 
December 2011 protests was deep engagement of young people, so-called, “creative class” 
(office employees, students etc.) into organization and participation in protests who are “the 
most mobilized and desirous part of society to express their civil position” (Vasilchenko, 2015, 
p. 40). V. Vasilchenko, who studied tendencies of protest mood in contemporary Russia, 
underlines, that big role of students in December 2011 protests, as most reactive to the situation 
                                                          
6 Information is taken from local mass media sources which covered December 2011 protests across all regions 




in the state, evidenced that democratic consciousness of Russians gradually matured and would 
continue to grow (ibid., p. 41). 
 
2.2.2 Consequences of the December 2011 protests: Kremlin reaction 
Despite such great scale throughout the country, December protests didn’t result in 
emergence in all-over population’s oppositional mood towards current Russian government. 
V. Putin was able to mobilize and consolidate his supporters which let him easily win 
presidential campaign (4 March 2012) (Sergeev, 2013, p. 135). 
 However, when political positions of the “United Russia” and V. Putin’s administration 
became legislatively secured for the next five years (new Duma elections will be held in 
September 2016; president elections in 2018) several actions were taken to avoid reiteration of 
December protests. Particularly, “About meetings” law was adopted in July 2012 which 
toughened rules for holding rallies (for example, fines for even small violations were highly 
increased etc.). Additionally, authorities got right to refuse in holding of rallies, if organizer of 
a protest committed an administrative offense conducting public events previously (ibid., p. 
136).  
Nevertheless, as the “Levada Center” polling organization points out, such actions did 
not conceive the expected effect: every third respondent in Moscow continued to support mass 
protests against political and socioeconomic situation in the country (ibid., p. 137). 
In order to legitimize his rule, V. Putin and his administration needed to return support 
of masses which was lost in December 2011, when most progressive groups of society (young 
high educated people, “creative” class) refused to support him and “United Russia” party and 
formed social base of protests. As Sergeev notes, V. Putin managed to achieve this goal by 
reorienting of policy focus from middle class as main target group to more poor conservative 
and traditional masses (ibid., p. 138). As a result, instead of policy designed for most educated 
and young people of Russia (“modernization”) like it was under the Medvedev presidency, new 
policy vector focused on such issues like religious values (“Pussy riot” case), rights of sexual 
minorities, patriotic values (Crimea annexation) etc. With emphasizing of such issues, Putin’s 
administration managed to calm protest mood in the country, to form reliable conservative 
majority and split the opposition which had not concrete agenda and common aims except 





Chapter 3. Theoretical foundation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings the theoretical framework to the study of protest activity 
phenomenon in modern Russia. In the beginning it introduces the concept of protest in a hybrid 
regime state as an attempt to look at the protest when country is under the phase of 
transformation from authoritarianism to democracy “which is peculiar to cotemporary Russia” 
(Ekman, 2009, p. 8).  
The concept allows to shed light on specific place of the protest for citizens in the hybrid 
state. In case of my work I would like to apply this concept for the 2011 December protests in 
Russia when the trigger of the protests across all regions in the country was alleged to be 
comprehensive falsifications at the State Duma elections held on 4 December 2011 
(Chuvashova, 2013, p. 42). Based on the findings of two researchers T. Lankina and A. 
Voznaya, who studied nature of protests in modern Russia (from 2007 to 2012) in the context 
of hybrid regime state, I try to find out a connection between possible motives of protestors 
under hybrid regime state and peculiarities of place where they protest (in my case, in 
Arkhangelsk). In their research, Lankina and Voznaya examine how local socio-economic and 
political environments affect the nature of claims towards the authorities and, therefore, how it 
affects nature of protest on the local level. 
 
3.2 What is a hybrid regime state? Russia as a hybrid state 
The notion of hybrid state is one that is not easy to define. However, one point where 
consensus might be drawn explains hybrid state as consisting of a “political regime which 
contains elements of both an autocratic system and democratic system” (Wuzumi, 2011). The 
difficulty of classification is also connected with the fact that each country labeled as “hybrid” 
may have its own additional set of traits of such hybridity (Bulumac, 2012). Hybrid regime 
state, as J. Ekman (2009) points out, may originate from collapse of one authoritarian regime, 
followed by the emergence of a new electoral-authoritarian regime or, vice versa, from the 
decay of a democratic regime (Ekman, 2009, p. 14). 
In their long-term fundamental study of hybrid state, A. Menocal, V. Fritz, and L. 
Rakner (2008) select out the following common traits which can be observed in every so-called 
state: 
Lack of governmental accountability 
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Hybrid regimes tend to be characterised by populist politics, “strong-man leadership” 
and opaque decision-making processes (Menocal et al., 2008, p. 5). 
Lack of credibility and/or trust in formal (democratic) institutions 
Despite considerable democratic advancements, especially in the area of elections, in 
such sort of sates, many institutions, which are key to make democracy work, suffer from lack 
of credibility or trust. As Menocal, Fritz and Rakner (2008) note: “frequently… national 
legislatures and political parties have shown to be institutions least trusted by the population, 
ranking much below Church, Army and so on” (ibid., p. 6). At the same time, however, 
electoral process is becoming routinized part of political life, although, citizen often doubt that 
elections can actually result in the alternations of power (ibid., p. 6). 
Lack of forms of political participation 
The present traits are, in many respects, run out of previous two. As Menocal, Fritz and 
Rakner point out “shallow political participation outside elections and weak governmental 
accountability lead to a sense of collective public frustration about what democracy can 
deliver” (ibid., p. 6). Therefore, people get frustrated with what they can actually achieve 
through formal political institutions. As it was mentioned, citizens have feeling of mistrust to 
chief institutions (political parties, judiciary etc.), since they are not adequately representative. 
Therefore, political participation often may take place outside formal institutional channels. 
Additionally, mass media and critical to the government civil society organisations may be 
harassed or victimised by government sanctions (ibid., p. 7). 
High level of corruption and clientelism 
As one of the most striking traits, A. Menocal, V. Fritz, and L. Rakner emphasize that 
hybrid state is driven by personalised interests and public officials often act “to further their 
own gains without much concern… of public good” (ibid., p. 7). Such a position frequently 
results in high level of corruption, especially if accountability system (beyond elections) is 
badly functioning. Moreover, even elections themselves may be the source of corruption since 
“campaigning is expensive, and politicians often seek to raise funds or win votes in various 
illicit ways” (ibid., p. 7). Civil services often continue to suffer from a mix of regional or 
political clientelism “ranging from the creation of additional ministries to accommodate 
important support groups to the abuse of civil servants to rally support for incumbents during 
pre-election periods” (ibid., p. 8). 
High expectations and weak sate capacity 
State capacity remains persistently weak, at the same time, however, more actors 
demand to be included in decision-making processes and expect better services and enhanced 
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state accountability (ibid., p. 7). This dual dynamic reinforces the prospects for instability in 
state. Country may be overwhelmed by new demands brought about by democratic pressures, 
and unable to respond adequately since it lacks necessary institutional and administrative 
capacity, and even legitimacy and credibility to do that (ibid., pp. 7-8). Consequently, country 
under hybrid regime condition is more prone to different sort of social unrests. 
Elite reversals 
Authors continue that usually in hybrid regime states “reversals have been induced by 
political elites rather than by pressures from below” (for example, presidents may correct chief 
law of country in order to prolong their ruling legally and so on) (Menocal et al., 2008, p. 8). 
Such type of reversals may be justified by the facts that more authoritarian measures are needed 
to strengthen state capacity. What is important to note that such sort of measures are often 
silently met by the broad sector of population since such elites are “perceived as strong leaders 
who will be able to provide some order to the lawlessness often associated with (incomplete) 
democratisation” (Rose, 2001). 
In their works, J. Ekman (2009), O. Bulumac (2012), A. Voznaya and T. Lankina 
(2015) consider Russia as the “hybrid” country, noting similar to mentioned traits of the 
Russian regime, stressing, however, some peculiarities in addition.  
Particularly, O. Bulumac (2012) points out that hybrid regime of modern Russia was 
absolutely static without movement to autocracy or democracy right before, so-called, 
“December democratic protests” in 2011 when society demonstrated its discontent with such 
state of affairs (Bulumac, 2012). Ekman (2009) underlines that, apart from others, main traits 
of the Russian hybridity are following: low confidence in political parties, low turnout in 
elections and pressure on election results, and low support of democracy among majority of 
population. He emphasized much bad quality of electing institute development in present 
Russia and people’s discontent with that. Such state of affairs forces citizens to find other ways 
to express their grievances to current politics of government including formation of civil NGOs 
or organization of protests like it was in Arkhangelsk, Moscow and other cities in December 
2011 (Ekman, 2009, p. 17; pp. 26-27). 
 Researchers T. Lankina and A. Voznaya (2015) stress importance of local factor in 
assessment of Russian hybrid regime state which is characterized by unevenness of democratic 
development and levels of political maturity across regions in Russia (Lankina & Voznaya, 
2015, p. 329). This finding of researchers implies that some regions of the country are more 
authoritarian than others (for example, while Caucasian regions are under the strict 
authoritarian regime, most European regions of Russia, including Arkhangelsk, have 
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respectively high level of development of democratic institutions), level of corruption and 
political competition on regional level can also differ from one region to another and so on 
(Lankina & Voznaya, 2015, pp. 328-329).  
There is lack of studies devoted to measurement of democracy rate at local areas of 
Russia. It is possible to examine it by looking at how much people are satisfied with 
development of democratic institutions on local and federal level. One of the way to do that is 
to see what kind of claims are usually prone to the protesters during some definite period of 
time. The protest researcher N. Chuvashova (2011) notes that from 2007 to the beginning of 
2011 most of the Arkhangelsk protesters’ claims in all protests were, as a rule, connected with 
issues like massive layoffs, growth of housing and communal services, pension reduction i.e. 
with socio-economic issues (Chuvashova, 2011, pp. 114-116). Therefore in Arkhangelsk by 
the beginning of 2011 claims connected with political maturity and democratic development 
in the region were secondary for protesters, while socio-economic issues usually came to the 
forefront. 
 
3.3 Protest in hybrid regime state 
 Since my study focuses the 10 December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk it is necessary 
to enlighten role of protest in hybrid regime state.  
As it was mentioned earlier, several researchers usually points out that people are often 
frustrated with quality of political, civil and administrative institutions under hybrid regime 
(Menocal et al., 2008, p. 7; Ekman, 2009, p. 17). Their ineffectiveness accompanied with 
corruption, clietelism, lack of governmental accountability and trust in formal institutions may 
result in people’s desire to “establish and support contact” with authority through informal 
institutional channels (Ekman, 2009, p. 26). In other words, people consider that, for example, 
activism in opposing parties or even participation in electoral process cannot let ordinary 
citizens control and influence on governmental policy properly in a way it should be in 
democratic state. At the same time, protesting actions, as an “informal form of political 
participation”, allow people to be heard by authorities and express people’s complaints about 
different aspects of governmental policy and political system in general which is not be done 
so effectively by any other form of political participation. Therefore, it is not surprise why 
number and frequency of protests in hybrid regime states are higher than in any other type of 
state (Wuzumi, 2011). Gathering together, it is connected with following factors:  
a) people legislatively get possibility to publicly express their dissent on matters they 
consider important for them; 
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 b) yet there is no normative and/or institutional base (or it is weak and corruptive) for 
solving arisen actual issues through respective institutions peacefully. 
Therefore, in my study I consider protest as “citizens’ expression of dissent or critique”, 
that involves “recourse to non-institutional forms of political participation” (Lankina & 
Voznaya, 2015, p. 328). As A. Voznaya and T. Lankina (2015) stress: “the limits of political 
activism within this type of political regime, thus, give salience to protests as a form of 
contentious political participation” (Lankina & Voznaya, 2015, p. 329).  
In other words, under conditions of hybrid state protest becomes one of the best way of 
authority-citizens “communication” since it reveals opportunity for citizens’ claims to be for 
sure heard by authorities which, in turn, increases chances of these claims to be solved. 
Especially important to note, that, as T. Lankina and A. Voznaya point out, such claims could 
not be only political ones but social, civil, cultural, and economical. 
 
3.4 Spatial analyses of protest under Russia’s hybrid regime: nature of protests 
across Russia’s regions 
In the present section comes a theory of two researchers T. Lankina and A. Voznaya 
who studied phenomenon of protests in “hybrid regime” Russia in the 2007-2012 period. Two 
researchers offer some theoretical insights which may help explain the nature of protests in 
hybrid regimes, underlying that usually researchers focus almost exclusively on national-level 
protest movements in hybrid regime states. However, as it was mentioned earlier, due to 
unevenness of democratic development, different levels of political competition and 
socioeconomic development across regions in Russia, major national trends frequently take 
different shape at the subnational level (Lankina & Voznaya, 2015, p. 329). In other words, 
Lankina and Voznaya suggest local approach in study of nature of protests in Russia, stressing 
importance of taking into account local factors. This is what makes their study attractive to me. 
In their work, Lankina and Voznaya explained “how the spatial socio-economic and 
political heterogeneity observed in many hybrid regimes can also result in spatially varied 
protest configurations” (ibid., p. 340). They stress that local socioeconomic and political 
environments in every region of Russia shape differently nature and propensity for protest 
(ibid., p. 330). In other words, researchers suggest an attempt at hypothesising the nature of 
protests across Russia’s regions focusing on local socio-economic and political contexts and 
their influence on shaping protests as a challenge to the Russian hybrid regime. 
In order to see “the effects of these contexts in shaping the nature and propensity for 
protest”, Lankina and Voznaya divided Russia into 12 economic regions: Central, Ural, 
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Northern (where Arkhangelsk city locates), Kaliningrad, North Caucasus, Volga, West 
Siberian, East Siberian, Volga-Vyatka, North-Western, Central Black Earth, Far Eastern. 
Regions are grouped into economic divisions on the basis of common economic and social 
goals, relatively similar economic conditions and potential, similar climatic, ecological, and 
geological conditions, and similar living conditions of the population (ibid., p. 330). Such a 
division was made since it could help to “identify some potential drivers of regional variation 
in the intensity of protests and the issue dimension of protest activism” (ibid., p. 340). 
The findings of two researchers are based on data from website namarsh.ru which 
aggregates dispatches from a network of regional correspondents and from press and online 
reports. The baseline data covers the period from March 2007, when namarsh.ru began its 
online dispatches, until December 2012. During this period, Voznaya and Lankina recorded 
4,726 protests with a combined total of 1,859,422 protesters (ibid., p. 331). It should be noted 
that namarsh.ru reports are updated daily by regional correspondents of the website, with each 
data entry accompanied by a weblink to the original press coverage of a given event. The 
availability of the original source ensures their ability to verify the validity of every data entry. 
Having analyzed all these protests during 2007-2012 period of time, Voznaya and 
Lankina select out five categories of them, noting that sometimes one protest may combine 
traits of several categories (ibid., p. 332). 
 
Table 2. Protest categories and description7 
 
Category  Description 
Political Politically motivated anti-government and 
anti-regime protests at municipal, regional, 
and national levels 
Economic Protests against government economic 
policies, such as those affecting exchange 
rates, wages; strikes related to wage and 
worker-rights issues 
Social Protests by, and specifically furthering the 
aims of, socially vulnerable groups of 
people such as pensioners, victims of 
Chernobyl, students, disabled people, 
people on state benefits 
Legal Protests targeting unpopular legislation, its 
implementation (labour, criminal, and 
administrative codes); protest against illegal 
acts by state bodies or private companies 
                                                          
7 The table is borrowed from: Lankina & Voznaya, 2015, p. 332 
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(forced eviction, construction in 
inappropriate areas) 
Ecological Environmental issues, hazardous work 
conditions, waste dumping, destruction of 
forest reserves, and protected woodlands 
Cultural Protests against the destruction of 
monuments and of historically valuable 
buildings and sites; against change in city 
(area) names 
 
As one of the main findings of their work, Voznaya and Lankina revealed that local 
socioeconomic and political environments of every selected region play crucial role in forming 
of nature of protest (these environments are different from one region to another but rather 
similar inside of it). Differences in these environments lead to distinctive demands of people 
towards authorities in various regions of the country (ibid., p. 330, p. 340). 
 
Table 3. Regional protests by type, % (2007-2012) 8 
 
 Political Economic Social Civic 
Central region  41 9 19 31 
Northern 
region  
42 17 19 21 
Kaliningrad 25 15 33 27 
Far Eastern 33 39 18 10 
Central Black 
Earth 
29 26 20 15 
North western 36 18 16 30 
Volga-Vyatka 42 21 15 22 
East Siberian 37 25 13 25 
West Siberian 38 19 26 17 
Volga 37 13 26 23 
North Caucasus 34 10 18 37 
Ural 35 23 23 19 
National 38 15 20 26 
 
As it could be viewed from the Table 3, the protests in the Northern region (where 
Arkhangelsk belongs to) in the period from 2007 to 2012 were mainly connected with political 
(42%) and socio-economic issues (36%).  
Voznaya and Lankina’s findings may be criticized for being too generic, mainly, 
directing to classification of protests in hybrid regime Russia during 2007 to 2012 and 
identifying common trends and traits of protests i.e. they did not focus on concrete cases. 
                                                          
8 The table is borrowed from: Lankina & Voznaya, 2015, p. 332 
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Therefore, it is impossible through their findings to reveal directly what made people in 
Arkhangelsk protest on the 10 December 2011 rally. They did not reveal specific 
socioeconomic and political motivators which affect the nature of protest in every single case. 
Such state of affairs allows me to contribute to their work under my specific case - 10 
December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk. In particular, trying to understand motives of the 
protest participants, I will apply findings of Voznaya and Lankina and reveal in the “Data 
presentation and analyses” chapter what concrete socioeconomic and political motivators did 
affect participators to become part of the protest. In turn, this will help me to suppose what 
category of protest, according to Voznaya and Lankina’s typology, Arkhangelsk protest was. 
 
3.4.1 Spatial analyses and 10 December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk 
December 2011 protest in Moscow is rather deeply studied both by Russian researchers 
and foreign ones (M. Mamonov; A. Sokolov; J. Nichol and others). Without many 
disagreements, they converge in opinion that protestors’ demands there were following: a) 
appointment of new State Duma elections since results of previous ones were absolutely 
falsified; b) release of "political prisoners"; c) liberalization of legislation regarding elections 
and registration of new (and previously banned) political parties; d) resignation of chief of 
Central Electoral Commission V. Churov. (Nichol, 2011, p. 2; Mamonov, 2013, p. 390). Based 
on different questionnaires, they added that people “protested against political system”, 
“against Putin”, “against lies, corruption and lawlessness” (Mamonov, 2013, pp. 390-391). 
Therefore, according to the typology of Voznaya and Lankina, 10 December 2011 protest in 
Moscow contained elements of “political” and “legal” protest type. 
In analysis of December 2011 protests both by Russian and foreign researchers, local 
protests (including one in Arkhangelsk) are usually viewed as “meetings of solidarity to 
Moscow protests” and “small copy” of the Moscow one (Shishkina, 2013, p. 379; Nichol, 2011, 
p. 2). It is connected with the fact that the formal cause of all December protests including one 
in Arkhangelsk was dissatisfaction with political situation in the state manifested, mainly, in 
the election fraud (Nichol, 2011, p. 2). Due to small amount of deep studies regarding the 
December protests across Russia, local protests are simply equalized one to another and studied 
in the context of 10 December 2011 protest in Moscow. 
In case of my work, I want to use findings of Voznaya and Lankina (the idea that 
specific local socioeconomic and political environments make local protest peculiar and, 
therefore, protestors have got different claims towards authority or different reasons for similar 
claims from one region to another) in order to clear up whether or not such an approach to the 
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study of December 2011 protests across Russian regions can really be applied to the 
Arkhangelsk rally. 
Thus, I select out three motivators through which motivation of protestors in 
Arkhangelsk is to be examined and analysed in the “Data presentation and analyses” chapter: 
1) discontent with political situation in Russia; 2) discontent with local political conditions; 3) 
discontent with local socioeconomic environment. First motivator is based on the formal cause 
of all December protests including one in Arkhangelsk, while second and third motivators are 
based on the theoretical findings of Voznaya and Lankina. Furthermore, I will try to answer 
the following questions: 1) what concretely did affect people’s motivation to get involved into 
the protest; 2) was role of local environments crucial for the protestors’ motivation or were 
they mainly triggered by general discontent with political system of Russia; 3) based on 




This chapter has sought to outline the theoretical foundation of the thesis. 
Firstly, I introduced the concept of the hybrid regime state and examine role of the 
protest under such regime in order to understand people’s motivation to use it as a form of 
political participation in there. Russia is considered to be such kind of state where role of protest 
as form of political participation is extremely high since formal institutional channels of 
authority-citizens “communication” (such as electoral institute, competitive multiparty system 
and other) work ineffectively or are not trusted. Based on that, it could be assumed that the 
protest in Arkhangelsk might not be directly connected with desire to improve political 
environment but with opportunity to air grievances connected with local social, economic, 
political environments as well. 
 Further, I presented the theory of T. Lankina and A. Voznaya who point out that in 
Russia (from 2007 to 2012) nature of protests across all regions might differ from one area to 
another even if they were united by one single cause (like, falsification of elections results for 
December 2011 wave of protests). Two researchers analysed 4,726 protests occurred in Russia 
during 2007-2012 period and concluded that such a dispersion in different claims in different 
regions could be explained by various local socio-economic and political environments across 
the Russian regions. 
 Voznaya and Lankina in their work did not examine concrete cases and did not select 
out exact local motivators connected with socioeconomic and political environments which 
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influenced on nature of specific protest. In my work, through the three protest motivators, I 
would like to find out what concretely affected people to take part in the 10 December 2011 
































Chapter 4. Methodology 
 
The present chapter of the thesis is focused on the following issues: choice of study 
area, informants and data collection technique. I reflect upon its strength and weaknesses and 
finally underline challenges during my fieldwork. 
 
4.1 Emphasizing human perspective 
Research regarding the 2011 protests in Russia could be studied from existing written 
sources: in particular, there are plenty of researches based on the official reports of federal 
public opinion agencies, viewpoints of key political elites and so on. The main disadvantage 
of them is that usually in protest studies in Russia, macro level analysis is used as a main 
approach; besides, the phenomenon of December 2011 protests in Russia is usually viewed 
through the perspective of Moscow protest and, as a consequence, local protests are viewed as 
a “small copy of the one in Moscow” (Shishkina, 2013, p. 379). It means that personal attitudes 
of protesters and peculiarities of place where protest occurred are often left out.  
As a consequence, such studies frequently do not take into account scale of Russia and 
the differences in life conditions among people in the state. As A. Sokolov (2013) notes: “the 
topic regarding protest activity in regions is poorly covered or even ignored by federal mass 
media and federal agencies…” (Sokolov, 2013, p. 401)9. 
Realizing that the December 2011 protests in whole Russia had much in common (for 
example, a main cause of the protest everywhere was suspicion that the election results were 
faked up), in the beginning of my work I assume that motives of protestors may vary, to some 
extent, from one region to another and are dependent on local socioeconomic and political 
environments which possibly could explain why scale of protests was different in various 
regions (Chuvashova, 2013, p. 45).  
Therefore, in order to understand these motives in my project (Arkhangelsk case), I 
found it most wise to focus on human dimension when I chose data collection technique. In 
other words, I wanted to examine in-depth the first hand experience of participators in order to 
understand their reasons to take part in the protest. Consequently, I chose interviewing as a 
prior data collection technique in order to see how local inhabitants themselves explain their 
motives of participation in the protest. 
                                                          
9 Translation of the present text is my own 
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This approach, with emphasis on human and local perspectives, corresponds to the main 
research question of the thesis: what motivated people to take part in the 10 December 2011 
protest in Arkhangelsk. 
 
4.2 Study area 
Arkhangelsk city was chosen to be a study area in the thesis. As the study area 
Arkhangelsk has several traits which make it attractive for research on people’s motives to 
protest in the December 2011 rally in the city. 
First trait is the great scale of the December 2011 protest which occurred in the city. It 
should be noted that since the collapse of the USSR, the protest after the Duma elections in 
December 2011 was the biggest in the new history of Arkhangelsk (Chuvashova, 2103, p. 44). 
Moreover, compared to other cities of Russia, where similar protests happened at the same 
time, the protest in Arkhangelsk was one of the biggest across the state with officially 
confirmed more than 2500 participators10 (ibid.). What is more, the Arkhangelsk region 
demonstrated one of the lowest support to the present ruling party “United Russia” in those 
elections (only 30% of people voted for the “United Russia”) which probably means that many 
protestors participated not just spontaneously but as a group which expressed their sceptical 
position towards the authorities in advance by protest voting. 
Second trait is the peripheral and close-to-border location of the city. As it was 
mentioned above, the protest in 2011 was more widescale only in several cities which have 
much in common: they are located in the central part of Russia; are economically well-
developed and have rather high socio-economic conditions of life. In this context Arkhangelsk 
stands out from a number of these cities since its location is in periphery of the state and the 
city has rather bad socio-economic situation (N(A)rFU, 2014). Despite other areas where 
protests were also large scaled, the relative closeness to other European states is another 
peculiarity of the city. Arkhangelsk is deeply integrated into the Barents Euro Arctic 
cooperation with north-European countries since 1990s, which makes it easier for the local 
population (due to the special “Pomor visa”) to travel abroad and host tourists from the 
Scandinavian states (Pomor tourist centre, 2015). Arkhangelsk, thus, in many respects, is 
culturally globalized with Northern Europe, which is a significant factor in the daily life of 
local inhabitants. 
                                                          
10 See Table 1 in the Chapter 2 
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Thirdly, the choice of Arkhangelsk facilitates a study from the perspective of a Russian 
regional reality – a perspective which is rarely applied by academics (Sokolov, 2013, p. 400). 
 
4.3 Informants: size and selection 
4.3.1 Criteria of informants’ selection 
Trying to understand who exactly I needed as informants I followed advice of V. 
Minichiello (1990) who says that good informants may “illuminate a situation, give insight… 
or relevant information about a particular event” (Minichiello, 1990, p. 197). In the context of 
my work, “relevant information about a particular event” implied also first-hand experience in 
participation on the 10 December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk. Therefore, my criteria of 
selection were as follows: informant resided in Arkhangelsk in 2011 and took part in the 10 
December protest. 
 
4.3.2 Sample size 
During the preparation period I had no predefined number of interviews that I wanted 
to conduct in my mind focusing only on desire to get in-depth information from the ones being 
interviewed. By the end of my fieldwork in the summer 2015, I had conducted seven interviews 
with people who took part in and/or helped to organize the Arkhangelsk protest in 2011. The 
group of interviewees consists of two women and five men including: three students (in the 
period of 2011); a lecturer of the local university; a professional politician who was 
representative of the opposing party; an entrepreneur; and one worker of the local Paper 
factory. 
In the sampling procedure, I mostly used “snowball sampling”: such an approach 
involves using a group of informants with whom I had made initial contact and asking them 
afterwards to “put the researcher in touch with their friends, then asking those people to be 
informants and in turn asking them to put the researcher in touch with their friends and so on” 
(Minichiello, 1990, p. 199)11.  
 Although the number of interviewees is relatively small, I share the opinion of A. 
Bryman (2012) who stresses that there is no need in great amount of interviews since focus in 
qualitative research is “to get rich detailed answers… and interest is in the interviewee’s point 
of view” (Bryman, 2012, p. 470). Besides, what I wanted was, first and foremost, as S. Kvale 
                                                          




(2007) underlines, to “understand the world as experienced by specific group of people” i.e. 
such an amount of interviewees in qualitative research may also be advantageous (Kvale, 2007, 
p. 43). In addition to this, talking about the process of conducting my data, I noticed after a 
while that many reactions and opinions of people began to repeat. Therefore, I started to realize 
that there is no need to increase my sample. As one of my interviewees said to me in the end 
of our conversation: “Maybe… I haven’t surprised you with what I’ve said… I guess, many 
people shared my views on protest events in Arkhangelsk in many respects”12. 
 
4.4 Interviewing  
4.4.1 Qualitative research: interview as a method of data-collection 
 
Qualitative research is… any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical 
procedures or other means of quantifications. It can refer to research about persons’ lives, behaviors, 
experiences, emotions about cultural phenomena, interaction between people, social movements etc. 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 11) 
 
As Strauss and Corbin (1998) note “there are many valid reasons to choose qualitative 
research” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 11). In particular, when researcher wants “to understand 
the meaning or nature of experience of persons”, “to obtain the details about phenomena such 
as feelings, thought processes that are difficult to extract through more conventional research 
methods”, he has to use qualitative method (ibid., pp. 10-11). Such a method was exactly what 
I needed since I tried to find out concrete local social and political factors (through individual 
experiences of protestors) which persuaded people to protest. 
I was interested in studying protest participators’ “perspectives on [their]… experiences 
and interpretations as expressed in their own words” (Minichiello, 1990, p. 93). This is 
somewhat different from participant observation and other popular methods which often rely 
on participation in, and observation of, action in the context of which it happens (ibid., p. 95).  
For this reason I selected qualitative in-depth interviewing as the main method to 
achieve my thesis’s aim. Such a method is the perfect one when the researcher has a strong 
desire, as S. Kvale (2007) notes, “to understand the world from the subjects’ points of view” 
and wants to “unfold the meanings of people’s experiences” (Kvale, 2007, p. 1). What was also 
important for me is that qualitative in-depth interviewing, as H. Rubin and I. Rubin (2005) 
underline, can help “to reconstruct events in which you did not participate” (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005, p. 3). That was exactly what I needed. 
                                                          
12 From the interview with Artour; detailed information of the interviewees is presented in the “Data presentation 
and analyses” chapter 
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4.4.2 Preparation and conducting interviews  
All seven interviews were conducted in Arkhangelsk, Russia during the summer 2015. 
Each informant was interviewed once in a pre-specified location and, each interview lasted 
approx. 45 minutes. With every informant’s permission, all of the interviewees were tape-
recorded13. 
Having chosen qualitative interview as the main data collection method, I used its semi-
structured variant with a pre-prepared interview guide14. Such a model of interviewing is very 
convenient for in-depth study of people’s experiences and interpretations of events since “type 
of questioning and discussion allow for greater flexibility than does survey-style interview” 
(Minichiello, 1990, p. 1992). In other words, I didn’t try to restrain my informants during the 
meetings but encouraged them to reflect in any way they wanted regarding the Arkhangelsk 
protest of 2011. 
Since the events I discussed with my interviewees had happened in the past, I needed, 
as A. Bryman (2012) notes, to “put emphasis on how the interviewee frames and understands 
issues and events from the past… [to find out] what the interviewee views as important in 
explaining and understanding these events” (Bryman, 2012, p. 471). Asking pre-prepared 
questions, I also followed up the reasoning about protests of my interviewee even if some of 
his/her arguments contradicted with my own assumptions. 
Generally, I had a fairly clear focus in my research and wanted to address some specific 
issues. Therefore, I had a set of questions to discuss necessarily with every interviewee 
including such topics as: a) phenomenon of December protests in 2011 in Russia; b) 
peculiarities of the protest in Arkhangelsk; c) background of informants; motives of 
participation, feelings about everything connected with Arkhangelsk protest which interviewee 
considered important; d) influence of Arkhangelsk protests on him/her later on; e) discussion 
of interviewee’s activity in forthcoming future. In addition, I collected every protestor’s 
information of a general kind (age, education, occupation etc.) for contextualizing his/her 
answers. 
Such a “soft” model of interviewing also was useful for me: after each conversation, if 
necessary, I tried to re-think some of the questions and topics I had in order to conduct 
subsequent interviews more effectively. 
                                                          
13 More detailed information about interviewing process is discussed in “challenges and reflections” part of the 
chapter 
14 See appendix 1. Interview guide  
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During the process of interviewing, a main principle of mine was to keep a balance 
between, from one side, my desire to get information about interviewees’ motivation in 
participation and, from the other, asking questions without leading informants too much in 
order to get the answers they really wanted to give. To do that, for instance, I never told 
informants my hypothesis or theory beforehand which I had in my work (I could share this info 
only in post-interview discussion). Besides, I formulated my questions in a neutral way, trying 
not to enclose in advance known or likely answers to the questions. 
Generally, all interviews went well and were conducted in favourable atmosphere. As 
a result, I got seven comprehensive interviews in which I touched upon every topic I had 
planned to. 
 All informants demonstrated interest in my study and tried to contribute me as much 
as they could. Also it should be noted that I followed the advice of A. Bryman and didn’t switch 
off tape-recorder right after discussion since even during the non-interview off-topic talk, 
interviewees might touch upon interesting and important points about the December 2011 
protest in Arkhangelsk (Bryman, 2012, p. 487). 
 
4.5 Challenges and reflections 
4.5.1 Access problem 
It will be described how I got access to my informants and the challenges in that 
process. 
Establishing contact 
Searching for potential informants was the first task I had to handle. My search was 
complicated by the fact that I had not any acquaintances who took part in the December 2011 
protest in Arkhangelsk. Additionally, by the time I started to collect my data four years had 
already passed from the 2011 protest and many participators might have changed their place of 
life. This really worsened my situation since, as H. Rubin and I. Rubin (2005) underline: 
“researcher’s own social networks are the easiest way to find and gain access to informants” 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 89). 
Therefore, I decided to look for potential informants through the electronic social 
network called “Vk.com” (Russian analogue of Facebook). In several groups devoted to the 
life in the Arkhangelsk region I announced briefly all general information about the project, 
leaving my email and telephone number in the end. I made a suggestion in the announcement 
to participate in the study for the ones who fit the criteria of candidate for interview. I found 
this way of searching the most successful in my case since: 1) the number of participants in 
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this group is very big (about 50 thousand people); 2) it allows people to keep their anonymity 
and increases chances to get a feedback from potentially interested people: in fact, several 
interviewees in the pre-discussion noted that they agreed to answer positively on my 
announcement only because it was possible to write or call directly to me without being 
publically revealed. I counted to find at least 2-3 people with such an approach, realizing that 
afterwards, my first informants could give me contacts of other people who took part in the 
protest i.e. “snowball technique” could be applied. 
All in all, I got ten email replies from people who showed their interest in participation. 
Trying not to bore people much I clarified more in detail what’s my project is about and what 
I needed from the informants. Ultimately, six of ten repliers refused to participate in the 
interviewing giving various reasons or just stopping get in touch with me. It is disputable 
whether the reasons of refusal were connected with, for example, fear to talk about such topics 
as “protest movement”, “corruption in Russia” or fear to be imprisoned for their activity. At 
the same time, it should be acknowledged that, as H. Rubin and I. Rubin (2005) stress: “people 
can often just be busy” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 93). One man who was not able to take part 
but had a strong will to participate told me: “The time of interviewing is very uncomfortable. 
Many russians, including me, have their summer vacation in July or August and prefer to spend 
time outside of the city”. 
The rest four people were successfully interviewed. Wishing to get more interviewees, 
I tried to find other ways to approach potentially relevant informants. 
Role of gatekeeper  
After a while it was clear for me that I was stuck in the process of searching for 
informants. Establishing contacts only by myself resulted in not so fertile outcomes I had 
expected. Additionally, since I had strict time limit I could not wait any longer when somebody 
would reply on my announcement in the Vk.com network again. That is why I decided to seek 
assistance from gatekeeper. 
A gatekeeper is “a term used in social analysis to refer to persons who are able to 
arbitrate access to a social role, field setting or structure” (Social research glossary, 2012). As 
I mentioned above, in my social network there were no people who were anyhow engaged in 
the protest in Arkhangelsk in 2011. However, luckily for me, I was able to find appropriate 
gatekeeper – leading journalist of local broadcasting company “Pomorie”. Being one of the 
most respected and popular journalist in Arkhangelsk, he has huge circle of acquaintances and 
relations, including political elites of Arkhangelsk. S. Johl and S. Renganathan (2009) note that 
gatekeeping can affect negatively on research, mainly, because gatekeepers may have “hidden 
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agendas, ideologies and cultures which may require the researcher to change how the research 
is talked about to conform to the gatekeepers attitude about what is being researched” (Johl & 
Renganathan, 2009, p. 42). In my case, due to long good relationships between me and my 
gatekeeper (in particular, he is a close friend of mine since childhood) I didn’t worry about any 
potential negative effects of gatekeeping usage. 
With the help of gatekeeper I get contact of the politician of opposing party who was 
not only participator but contributed in organization of the Arkhangelsk protest. In fact, this 
politician was very interested in contribution and expressed his desire to help me as much as 
possible. It was probably connected with field of his activity. H. Rubin and I. Rubin (2005) 
emphasize that such situation may happen because some informants “participate in interviews 
to gain favorable publicity for their political or social concerns, occupational or social group, 
or with whatever they identify” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 91). In any case, this informant gave 
me contacts of his acquaintances who took part in the protest as well. Thereby, due to assistance 
of gatekeeper I was able to conduct three more interviews. 
In general it should be noted that people whose contacts I got with help of the 
gatekeeper were more favourable in their conversation with me. H. Rubin and I. Rubin (2005) 
point out that such situation is not surprising since quality of interviewing depends on trust in 
regards to interviewer very much and informants trust much more interviewer if he or she “has 
been recommended be their [interviewees’] friends or colleagues” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 
91). 
Thus, since my data collection period started in the summer 2015 (almost four years 
after December protest in Arkhangelsk) and due to absence of appropriate social connections 
it was very tough task to find relevant informants for my research. I have solved this problem 
by using electronic social network “Vk.com” (where I placed basic info regarding my project 
and leave contacts of mine) and with help of the gatekeeper. All that helped me to conduct four 
and then three more interviews respectively. In whole, role of the gatekeeper should not be 
underestimated. His efforts helped me find almost half of my informants. I was lucky to avoid 
minuses which might be caused by gatekeeping. Moreover, informants I got from him were 
even more favourable to talk with me since I was recommended by him. 
However, my approach of gaining access to informants is not without drawbacks. 
Particularly, it’s obvious that social network “Vk.com” is not used by every inhabitant of 
Arkhangelsk, including the ones who protested. Although, at the same time, Russian expert in 
protest issues N. Chuvasheva (2013) points out that “mainly youth and middle-aged people” 
(who use such electronic social networks most) took part in December 2011 protest in 
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Arkhangelsk (Chuvasheva, 2013, p. 42). It, however, doesn’t mean that my approach hasn’t 
got weak spots, but in my case it seemed to be the most relevant anyway. 
 
4.5.2 Developing contacts and informants’ security 
After the contact with all my informants was established with help of social network 
“Vk.com” and gatekeeper’s assistance I understood that in order to develop contacts I have to 
think, first and foremost, how to secure my interviewees’ from potential threats. These threats 
were mainly connected with specifics of my work: interviewing of the ones who took part in 
protest and who were eager to change political and/or socio-economic systems of Russia. In 
other words, I assumed that my interviewees might be scared for being, for instance, persecuted 
or anyhow pressured if they took part in a study like mine. 
Therefore, following principle of the qualitative research formulated by H. Rubin and 
I. Rubin (2005) I wanted to “obtain rich data in ways that do not harm those being studied” 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 97). In other words I had to do my best in order to create such 
conditions which let my interviewees feel as much comfortable as possible and therefore let 
me get relevant data.  
To begin with, during our first talk by e-mail or telephone I informed potential 
candidates in details and maximally sincerely about this work. It was very important to stress 
that I was a student, my project was independent and led only by my own research interest. 
Besides, I underlined that all personal information about informants would be anonymized. 
Some of the interviewees strongly insisted on the point regarding anonymity and, as a proof, 
demanded me to send them a copy when thesis would be done. 
Secondly, the crucial point regarding securing my informants was choice of the 
interviewing place. Taking into consideration, that I wanted to discuss such topics as political 
organisation of Russia, phenomenon of protest, perspectives of Russian political system etc. I 
understood how important was to find secluded quiet place without unwanted witnesses who 
could embarrass my informants. Therefore, I could hardly conduct interviews in the places like 
street parks, cafés etc. When my informants and I agreed upon interview I asked which place 
would be most appropriate letting them choose most comfortable for them one. It was not 
surprising for me that ones (namely, three informants) who had possibility to be interviewed in 
their work offices suggested them to be such place. The rest four were interviewed in the office 
room of the company “MobileTelephoneSystems” (MTS). My mother, who worked in this 
company, helped me to get access for the whole empty office room of the organization. I found 
this variant to be the best one since: a) MTS company is located right in the city centre which 
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makes it convenient to get from every part of the city; b) nobody could disturb us during 
interview process. 
 In order to develop contact with informants better, every interview I started with off-
topic discussion about my study in Norway, Norwegian mode of life and so on letting 
interviewee reflect on it. I could initiate off-topic discussion about issues which were in interest 
of interviewee because, according to H. Rubin and I. Rubin, it helps to establish conducive for 
interview atmosphere (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p. 90). The aim of mine was to be open, fair 
and honest to build trust between me and interviewee. In general, I felt that I succeeded in that, 
especially with interviewees who I got from my gatekeeper: since I was recommended to them 
by mutual acquaintance, as I mentioned earlier, they felt even more benevolent to talk with me. 
Anyway, all informants almost always were deeply engaged in the process of interviewing 
without such problems as refusal of tape recording and so on. 
 Thus, in order to develop contacts with the informants who agreed to be interviewed I 
had, first of all, to create such conditions which allowed interviewees feel comfortable and safe. 
Having led by “principle of beneficence” (“risk to harm a subject should be the least possible”) 
(Kvale, 2007, p. 28), I focused on three main issues regarding that: providing sincere and clear 
information of my project; choice of appropriate for interviewing place and off-topic talk in 
the beginning of interview. 
 
4.5.3 Researcher’s identity: being an insider and outsider  
 Defining an “identity” concept is very challenging task. Usually researchers note that 
it is one of the most extensively studied constructs in the social sciences and it is possible to 
provide perspectives from psychology, sociology, ethnic studies when they give definition 
(Springer, 2011). However, all of the approaches have much in common, stressing generally 
that identity is examined as “properties based on the uniqueness and individuality which makes 
a person distinct from others” (Prabhudesai, 2014). 
The problem of how insider or outsider role of the researcher affect conducted data is 
very typical for qualitative research (Greene, 2009, p. 2). Insider and outsider researches have 
their own pros and cons connected with access issues, problem of objectivity, biases of 
researcher etc. In the present project, role of my identity as set of my own unique properties, 
had an impact on the research from two points at the same time: 1) my “Russianness” (i.e. my 





My nationality had both negative and positive effects on data I got from the 
interviewees. 
I could not refuse my “Russianness” that influenced on my research due to several 
factors:  a) first of all, I am Arkhangelsk inhabitant who has been lived whole life in the city; 
b) I am a native Russian speaker. Thence, consequent limitation of having these traits was my 
biased attitude in regards to some phenomena. At the same time W. Filstead (1971) considered 
such situation not to be extremely negative: “it’s naive to assume that biases due to the 
personality of the interviewer could be avoided… each interviewer is somehow stereotyped” 
(Filstead, 1971, p. 87). In my case, this biased attitude manifested itself in my witnessing of 
political and socio-economic situation of Russia and the city of Arkhangelsk before, during 
and after protest events in December 2011. Besides, personally I sympathized with protestors 
although I didn’t take part in it. As well as protest participators, I was insulted by information 
that results of the Duma elections might be falsified; I had a strong will to improve political 
and socio-economic systems in country. Realizing that on the stage of preparing for my 
interviews, I followed advice of H. Rubin and I. Rubin (2005) who point out that researches 
should “not pretend that [they] have no biases… but to understand how [their] feelings might 
slant the research… and work to formulate questions to offset the biases” (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005, p. 82).In particular, in order to reduce damage of my biased attitude I tried myself to be 
led by principles of objectivity in my research leaving behind my personal feelings as much as 
possible. Although, it should be admitted, that it’s impossible to avoid that completely. 
My “Russianness”, however, had favourable impact on the research as well. In 
particular, gaining access with informants generally was much easier for me being a Russian, 
native inhabitant of Arkhangelsk, because I had no problem with  living place, unfamiliarity of 
area and so on – all problems which are faced when researcher had project in foreign for him 
country. Additionally, I had personal experience of events I studied which was advantageous 
as well. As H. Rubin and I. Rubin (2005) note: “trust [between interviewer and interviewee] 
increases if people see that you share a common background with them” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, 
p. 92). 
The language issue is a challenge in many (especially cross-cultural) qualitative 
researches. Being a “bedrock of qualitative enquiry, language is a fundamental tool through 
which qualitative researches seek to understand human behavior, social processes and cultural 
meanings that inscribe human behavior” (Liamputtong, 2008, p. 21). During interviews it was 
much easier to achieve these aims, since me and my informants are native Russian speakers. 
In addition to this, my “Russianness” and, specifically, belonging to the Arkhangelsk city 
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allowed me to understand better non-verbal language which was hardly possible for outsider. 
For sure, it improved mutual understanding between me and my informants and quality of 
collected data in general. 
Doing research as a student of University of Tromsø, Norway 
Having realized my “Russianness”, I understood that some certain impact on my 
research would be affected by my close interconnection with Norway: I did my work as a 
master student from the University of Tromsø (UiT), Norway. In order to understand role of 
this issue it is necessary to overview briefly what kind of attitude among Arkhangelsk 
inhabitants exists now in regards to Norway. 
After the collapse of USSR, foreign policy of Russia towards Norway became duplex: 
national and regional (since Norway became one of the neighbors of new Russia). One of the 
greatest expression of relations between two states on regional level was emergence of regional 
organisation “BarentsEuroArctic Region” in 1993, where northern areas of Norway and Russia 
(including Arkhangelsk reg.) are part of. For sure, regional cooperation affected significantly 
on relations between northern regions of Norway and Russia. In particular, after 20 years of 
such cooperation there were realized numerous initiatives and projects in socio-economic and, 
especially, in cultural dimensions (such as exchange programs between universities, annual 
sport competitions, joint music festivals and so on) (Norway. The official website in Russia, 
2013). Northern inhabitants from both sides, in whole, have become more familiar with mode 
of life of each other which, consequently, improve mutual image of both states in their eyes. 
In last years, however, due to growing tension in Norway-Russia relations in general 
(caused by events like NATO exercises in Northern Norway in 2013-2014; Russian annexation 
of Crimea etc.), image of Norway in the eyes of many northern residents of Russia has gone 
downhill. This tendency was deepened with emergence of set of articles about Norwegian 
foreign policy in Russian North, particularly, its attempts to “erode Russian space of European 
North and norweginalize it” (Semushin, 2013). Besides, in 2012 in Arkhangelsk there was 
arrested one of the employee of Northern Arctic Federal University (Arkhangelsk) I. Moseev 
who was accused in “high treason for cooperation with Norway” (Semushin, 2012). It is 
remarkably important to underline that in these critical articles, University of Tromsø is 
labelled as an ideological base for policy of “norwegianization” of Russian north (Semushin, 
2013). 
It was clear for me that many Arkhangelsk inhabitants might be well-known with this 
information and, therefore, be sceptical about me, as an interviewer, who carried out research 
as a representative of the UiT. Probably, my belonging to this university was one of the factor 
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why some potential informants refuse finally to take part in the research: as I mentioned ten 
people were interested in interviewing at first but after initial discussion about topic, my 
background and place of study six of them rejected an opportunity. In any case, in order to 
decline negative influence of my identity as “one who does research on behalf of rival 
university” (as one of potential informant who refused to take part in research called me) I did 
my best to follow H. Rubin and I. Rubin advice. They note that, depending on different situation 
“you can focus on one role [of yours] or another... but the role in which you present yourself 
should be part of who you actually are” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 86). Therefore in the first 
talk with informants and again in pre-interview discussion I stressed that my belonging to UiT 
did not play as big role as interviewees could think. I emphasized other roles of mine like 
“native Arkhangelsk resident”, “Russian speaker”, “witness of the protest events” and so on in 
order to demonstrate that these roles of mine were more crucial and influential for me as a 
researcher. Anyway, sometimes I felt slight skepticism from informants in the beginning (once 
I was even ironically called “Norwegian spy”). In addition, one informant was concerned that 
results of my work would be available for foreigners and didn’t want them to have impression 
or Russia as “non-democratic state with bad quality of political culture”15.  
It should be noted that positive effects of my belonging to the foreign university were 
as well. Particularly, one of the interviewees felt more inspired when I informed him about my 
interconnection with UiT. He pointed out that this kind of researches “should get publicity 
abroad”16. In whole, however “belonging to UiT” factor should not be overrated. Although 
two informants drew their attention to that, the rest (five) were indifferent in regards to this 
issue: it was unimportant for them at all during interview. 
Regarding the identity issue, thus, my “Russianness” (which includes my nationality, 
background and native language) and deep interconnection with Norway had a strong impact 
on result of my research. During the process of interviewing and preparation for it the most 
important thing for me was to get as much benefits as possible from my identified roles and, at 
the same time, to decrease maximally negative effects of them. 
 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have reflected on the methodological issues of my study. 
                                                          
15 From the interview with Pavel 
16 From the interview with Artour 
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Data collection was carried out during summer 2015 in Arkhangelsk, Russia – place 
where one of the biggest regional protest after the Duma elections in December 2011 occurred. 
 I chose in-depth qualitative interview, as most appropriate for my research method, 
since it let me stress human dimension of my work: find out personal perspective on the 
Arkhangelsk protest. 
In the beginning of my data collection period, the most challenging task was to establish 
and develop contacts with most relevant for my research informants. With use of social network 
“Vk.com” and the gatekeeper I found thirteen people, seven of which were finally interviewed. 
Since I studied such topic as protestors’ activity I had to pay much attention to the security 
issues (to find appropriate place of interviewing, guarantee anonymity and so on). Besides, my 
identity had both positive and negative effects on my work as well, since different people paid 
attention to different aspects of my identity: what was important in positive and negative sense 
for ones in regards to my properties was indifferent to others. In any case, my aim was to get 
as much profit as possible from my identities.  
Thus, due to the format of my research method (qualitative in-depth interviewing) 
alongside with described above attempts of mine to get through challenges during data 


















Chapter 5. Data presentation and analyses 
 
The present chapter analyses the fieldwork data. It starts with presenting participants’ 
backgrounds, especially focusing such issues as education, occupation and his or her role in 
the protest (regular participant or contributor to organizing). Further, the chapter attempts to 
go into the interviewees' individual reflections on what motivated them to take part in the 
Arkhangelsk protest. Through the motivators presented in chapter 3 and interviewees’ 
narratives, the chapter 5, therefore, seeks to explain people’s motivation in participation in the 
Arkhangelsk protest.  
 
5.1 Informants’ presentation 
5.1.1 Interviewees’ anonymity 
Participation in a protest might be considered as a potentially sensitive topic, especially 
if people commit illegal actions during it or if a rally is organized without authorization of the 
government. However, the 10 December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk was organized and 
carried out properly in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation (Chuvashova, 
2013, p. 44). In this sense, involvement into the protest was just a legal form of political 
participation granted by the Russian Constitution in the articles 23, 30, 31, 37 (Pratsko & 
Sphak, 2013, p. 24).  
At the same time, being concerned with situation around political prisoners in Russia 
(resonance cases of S. Udaltsov, P. Lebedev and others who were persecuted for their political 
activity) I decided not to disregard security aspect in my research (Institute of Modern Russia, 
2014). I did not want to put interviewees in any sort of danger. Hence, my informants were 
guaranteed anonymity in my study. Generally, as it was mentioned in the chapter 4, some of 
the informants shared my concern and wanted to keep their anonymity. Only one person, Oleg, 
underlined that he did not worry about being publicly revealed and was “ready to share my 
experience openly”17. 
In order to assure anonymity, first of all, I use pseudonyms instead of the informants’ 
real names. Additionally, I decide not to provide all personal information about informants in 
details in order to make identification of them even harder. As a result, I try my best, from one 
side, to minimize any sort of negative consequences to my informants, from the other side, to 
do deep research about people’s motives to be involved into the protest. 
                                                          
17 From the interview with Oleg 
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5.1.2 Background of informants 
Education and occupation 
Seven people were interviewed for the study. Educational and occupational information 
about the interviewees is presented in the Table 4 and reflects state of affairs by 2011. Four of 
the interviewees had higher education, two had secondary. One interviewee held a Ph.D. Five 
of the informants were working while the remaining two were students in the college and the 
university.  
Age, living arrangements, degree of involvement into the protest 
All seven interviewees currently live in Arkhangelsk and consider themselves as native 
Arkhangelsk residents even though Oleg, Julia and Artour moved to the city when they were 
children. 
All of the interviewees were aged between 21 and 37 in 2011; two of the informants 
are female and five are male. The sample reflects countrywide situation: “Levada Centre” 
polling organization notes that “young people constituted the majority [of protesters in entire 
Russia]… they were more likely to be male than female” (Ross, 2015, p. 43). Additionally, the 
protest researcher N. Chuvashova (2013) points out that most of the protesters in Arkhangelsk 
were students and young adults (Chuvashova, 2013, p. 44). 
Three of the protesters were engaged deeper into the protest than others. Oleg, Denis 
and Anton were not just participants, but contributed to the organisation of the 10 December 
2011 Arkhangelsk protest. One of the task in the analysis is to indicate whether there was a 
difference between interviewees which were ordinary participants and the ones who 
contributed as organizers. 
Summing up, the informants’ background suggests that all of them are relevant 
participants for this research. From one hand, the interviewees had various occupational and 
educational backgrounds, from the other, they represent general trend of a typical protester in 
those events in Arkhangelsk (being young, well-educated people). 
 
Table 4. Interviewees' educational and occupational backgrounds (in 2011); 
degree of involvement into the protest18 
 
Pseudonym Sex Age Education Field of occupation Contributed 
organizing of 
the protest 
(“” if yes) 
Julia F 31 Ph.D Assistant professor  
                                                          
18 Source: fieldwork 2015 (June-August) 
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Anton M 24 Higher Editor in journal, photographer  
Artour M 28 Higher Owner of the publishing agency  
Pavel M 37 Special 
Secondary 
Worker in Paper factory  
Oleg M 36 Higher Politician  
Denis M 21 Special 
secondary 
Student  
Katya F 22 Higher Student  
 
5.2 First motivator: dissatisfaction with political situation across the state 
As it was mentioned earlier in the thesis, the main hypothesis of the study is that local 
environments of the Arkhangelsk region might affect nature of 10 December protest in the city. 
In other words, people’s desire to be involved into the rally might not be formed only by 
discontent with national political system of Russia but by local conditions of the region as well. 
However, since the formal cause of all December protests including one in Arkhangelsk 
was dissatisfaction with political situation in the state which was manifested, mainly, in the 
election fraud (Nichol, 2011, p. 2), discontent with general political situation in Russia is 
examined here as a first variable which affected motivation of Arkhangelsk protestors. 
In addition to this, I rely on the findings of the protest researchers A. Voznaya and T. 
Lankina who define local socioeconomic and political environments as crucial factors to affect 
protestors’ motivation. Hence, influence of these factors is examined later in the chapter as 
well. 
Through the three types of motivators - 1) discontent with political situation in Russia; 
2) discontent with local political and 3) discontent with local socioeconomic conditions - 
motivation of protestors in Arkhangelsk is examined and analysed in this chapter. In this 
section determinants which are not associated with local conditions of the Arkhangelsk region 
are presented. 
 
5.2.1 Duma election fraud as a motive to participate  
To begin with, it is necessary to look at motives of the Arkhangelsk protesters through 
election fraud as a determinant which united all protests across Russian. It is connected with 
the fact that the formal cause of all December protests in Russia was information that results 
of Duma elections might be falsified (Nichol, 2011, p. 6). 
Every interviewee agreed that falsifications of the election results motivated them, to a 
greater or lesser extent, to become part of the protest. However degree of importance of this 
factor differs from one person to another. Julia, for example, emphasized it very much, saying 
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“I was just angry and really shocked with that election fraud stuff… [feeling] disgusted to be 
cheated was first thing in my mind when I decided to protest”19. Such an important role of this 
factor for his personal choice to participate was followed by Denis, saying that “I, as well as 
most of people there, wanted [by protest actions] to say my “no” in order to force the authority 
to re-count votes”20. Oleg and Anton, at the same time, consider this factor to be very important 
for them however they look at the falsifications as a problem of the Russian political system in 
general. Oleg says that he “had, of course, claims to the “clearness of elections” but priority 
for him was “to restore order in [my own] land”21. Anton, in many respects, shares views of 
Oleg saying that “I was pissed much that… voice of voter didn’t decide anything… but that was 
just a consequence of political system of the state”22. 
For the other interviewees, falsification issues as a main motivator was even less 
important. Katya, for instance, said that the falsification issue was important for her only 
because those Duma elections were first in her life and she felt insulted since she “voted for 
the «Communist party» of Russia, not for «United Russia»”23. Artour looked at the “universal 
violations during the electoral process”24 as just one of the urgent problems of Russia at that 
time. Interesting, that Pavel did not participate in the Duma elections at all since “electoral 
institute [may not] help people in… overcoming of stagnation of political life [in Russia]” and 
looked at the falsifications as “just a top of the iceberg of problems in the state”25. 
Thus, despite the fact that possible falsifications of the Duma elections was a formal 
cause of protest wave in entire Russia, my informants had rather various views on this 
information as their personal motivation to protest. While ones might be seriously triggered by 
evidences that elections were falsified (Julia, Denis), the others had more neutral relation to 
that. Pavel, for example, almost ignored that when decided to go on the rally. Other informants 
might look at it as one of the motivators which affected them more or less to get involved into 
the protest (Anton, Artour, Oleg, Katya).  
Some informants might look at the election fraud as a strong motivator for them but, at 
the same time, they did not separate this factor with problems of political development of 
Russia in general.  
 
                                                          
19 From the interview with Julia 
20 From the interview with Denis 
21 From the interview with Oleg 
22 From the interview with Anton 
23 From the interview with Katya 
24 From the interview with Artour 
25 From the interview with Pavel 
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5.2.2 Similar to the Moscow protest? General political claims 
 
“We knew that similar protests are going to be organized in many cities so we wanted to make it louder to the 
centre. We even tried to cooperate with other regions, although coordinated common actions badly… But we 
supported each other: we knew that we were not alone in Arkhangelsk“26  
 
As it was mentioned in the «Methodology» chapter, many scholars (V. Shishkina, J. 
Nichol and other) who studied the December wave of protests noted that local protests were 
just small reflections of one held in Moscow. According to them, people in the different regions 
of Russia were motivated by similar to Moscow protesters’ triggers. As it was pointed out in 
«Theoretical foundation» chapter, nature of the Moscow protest was purely political. It focused 
on the issues connected with development of the democratic institutes in Russia. The demands 
of protestors in Moscow, in many respects, coincided with weak traits of hybrid regime state. 
A. Menocal (2008) selects out the following traits of so-called state: lack of governmental 
accountability; lack of credibility and/or trust in formal (democratic) institutions; lack of forms 
of political participation; high level of corruption; high expectations and weak sate capacity; 
elite reversals (Menocal et al., 2008, pp. 5-8). In this sense, motivation of Arkhangelsk 
protestors might me also viewed through the prism of hybrid regime state traits. 
In other words, this group of factors includes discontent with the political system of 
Russia in general. It should be noted, that this group is also closely connected with the election 
fraud. However, I separate election fraud concerns in order to see what kind of claims regarding 
political system of Russia were important for Archangelsk residents in addition to the 
falsification issue. 
Two groups of factors linked to discontent with the political system of Russia were 
identified as ones which affected motivation of protesters in Arkhangelsk to be involved into 
the rally: 1) irremovability of the leading authority holders; 2) corruption, discontent with 
quality of governing; poor conditions of electoral law. 
Irremovability of the leading authority holders 
Among other triggers to protest which are not connected with local conditions of the 
Arkhangelsk region, my informants called irremovability of the crucial politicians of Russia. 
As it is indicated in «Theoretical foundation» chapter, such kind of irremovability 
evidences about “lack of governmental accountability” in the state, where power is intensely 
personalised around the several figures for a long period of time (Menocal et al., 2008, p. 33).  
                                                          
26 From the interview with Julia 
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Katya, trying to explain scope of wave of protest not only in Arkhangelsk but in Russia 
in whole, noted that “people began to feel being «choked» of endless irrevomability of the 
authorities”27. Such an attitude was followed by Anton calling “weariness from irremovability 
of those in power”28 as something which motivated him to be engaged. Although Artour didn’t 
call this factor as his personal driver to protest he acknowledged that protest mood in the 
country increased “[since] people get tired of the similar faces in television…”29. Noteworthy 
that here the interviewees talked about federal level politicians, not local ones. 
Some of interviewees especially stressed “Putin-Medvedev presidency reshuffle”30 in 
September 2011 as a “last straw”31 which people could no longer tolerate. In other words, 
people were disgruntled about some aspects of Russian political system decisively 2 months 
before the elections. It means that they were ready to take part in the protest a little before the 
election fraud. The latter for them was just a convenient cause to express discontent. 
Although Julia, as it was noted earlier, was triggered mostly by information about 
falsifications, she noted that she was “angry that they [Putin and Medvedev] decided to declare 
this president reshuffle boldly openly”32. Anton pointed out that “[my] and people’s around 
angriness, I believe, much increased in September when Medvedev, de-facto, declared Putin 
to be the subsequent president without asking citizens!” 33.  Oleg also mentioned this factor to 
be influential for him and linked it to the occupation he had. As a professional politician and 
representative of the opposing to the «United Russia» party in Arkhangelsk he expressed his 
concern with “decline of competition in last years in Russian system of governance”34. 
 S. Sergeev (2013) points out that September reshuffle of Putin and Medvedev was 
crucial catalyzer of protest mood across Russia (Sergeev, 2013, p. 132). In this sense, 
irremovability of the crucial politicians was something that might unite protestors in their 
discontent across entire state. 
Expression of general political claims: corruption, bad quality of governing, poor 
condition of electoral law 
                                                          
27 From the interview with Katya 
28 From the interview with Anton 
29 From the interview with Artour 
30 24th September 2011 president D. Medvedev said that he was not going to run for a  president, since he and 
prime-minister V. Putin “had already agreed about who is going to be next president” (Sergeev, 2013, p. 133). At 
the same time, Medvedev declared that he is going to lead United Russia in the following elections in Duma in 
December 2011. This event is considered to be important in ruining image of Medvedev among citizens and 
aggravate bad image of UR party.  
31 From the interview with Julia 
32 Ibid. 
33 From the interview with Anton 
34 From the interview with Oleg 
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In their answers, interviewees might underline concern with political situation in Russia 
as a foundation for their desire to participate in the protest. However, selection of a few concrete 
factors was often challenging for them. For example, Julia mentioned her dissatisfaction with 
quality of governance of the federal authorities: “instead of governing properly… they [federal 
authorities] started working on themselves”35. 
Denis called himself “a professional political protester since 2006” who pursued 
political aims in the December protest. He abstractly called his activity as “fight against 
curtailment of democracy in Russia”. According to him, protestors in the entire country 
including Arkhangelsk protested “in one union for the sake of a common goal of 
democratization” 36. 
Anton stressed that “by the beginning of 2010s people… started to require 
modernization, progress and forward movement comprehensively, fight against desolating 
corruption, development of civil society, transpiration of power structures… but none of that 
was achieved”. As well as Denis, Anton was a contributor to the organization of Arkhangelsk 
protest. He emphasized that he “wanted personally to make an impact to development of my 
country… and planned [protest] to be as a general civil meeting… where educated citizens of 
liberal views would go to the square with posters, express their dissatisfaction with political 
situation in Russia”37. Anton said that he, as one of the organizers, was contributing in writing 
protest resolution and made it, in many respects, similar to the resolution of the Moscow 
protest. In the resolution, he stressed such demands as 1) demand of reelection; 2) warning 
about the inadmissibility of falsification in the forthcoming presidential elections; 3) demand 
of liberalization of the electoral legislation. 
Thus, findings of study indicate that view on the local protests as “meetings of solidarity 
to Moscow protests” and “small copies” of Moscow (Shishkina, 2013, p. 379; Nichol, 2011, p. 
2) has some foundation. In many respects, it is connected with the fact that Arkhangelsk 
protesters like Moscow ones had issues in regards to development of the democratic institutes 
in Russia. At the same time, as it was mentioned in chapter 3, protestors in different regions 
might have different reasons to protests for similar claims. Therefore, although interconnection 
of claims of Arkhangelsk and Moscow protestors is present, reasons to protest might still be 
different. 
                                                          
35 From the interview with Julia 
36 From the interview with Denis 
37 From the interview with Anton 
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In Arkhangelsk, as narratives of informants’ evidence, some of the protesters were 
triggered by dissatisfaction with democracy development in the state. As a result they 
expressed claims like: liberalisation of electoral and political parties’ laws; resignation of 
leading politicians who, in their opinion, might be involved into election fraud (chief of 
Electoral Commission V. Churov, prime-minister V. Putin and others). 
Not surprisingly, that discontent with political situation in the state as a motivator to be 
engaged into the protest was especially strong among the ones who contributed in organizing 
Arkhangelsk protest (Oleg, Denis, Anton). Basically, they were the ones who viewed the rally 
in Arkhangelsk as a part of the unified wave of December protests across the country. It might 
explain why the resolution of the Arkhangelsk protest almost coincided with the resolution of 
the protest in Moscow and did not reflect demands based on local problems. 
Besides, it is noteworthy that informants’ demands connected with dissatisfaction of 
political situation in Russia corresponded many traits of hybrid regime state presented in 
«Theoretical foundation» chapter. Particularly, Julia, as it was noted, mentioned corruption of 
Russia as a motivating factor for her to protest. She was followed by Anton and others who at 
that time had expectations regarding development of democratic institutes in the state and were 
tired of lack of governmental accountability in the state. However, their expectations, in many 
respects, were broken by tendencies of “growing authoritarianism of Russian political system 
in last 10 years” (Sergeev, 2013, p. 130). The last straw of such growth was the reshuffle of 
Putin-Medvedev which was done without opinion of citizens. Additionally, if falsifications of 
election results as people’s triggers to protest , would be viewed through the prism of the traits 
of hybrid regime like “high level of corruption” and “weak development of democratic 
institutes” (Menocal et al., 2008, p. 6; p. 8), Arkhangelsk protest might be considered as a 
reaction of people on weaknesses of such regime. 
Table 5 indicates degree of the interviewees’ concern with general political 
environment in Russia as a motivator to be involved into the protest. The degree of concern is 
based on my own perception after the conversation with the informants. 
 
Table 5. Degree of importance of discontent with general political situation in 
Russia as a motivator to protest 
 
Pseudonym Discontent with political situation 
in Russia in general 
Contributed organizing of the 
protest (“” if yes) 
Julia XXX  
Anton XXX  
Artour X  
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Pavel X  
Oleg XXX  
Denis XXX  
Katya X  
Degree of concern: XXX – extremely important for the interviewee; XX – less important; X – least important; 
empty space – not important at all (or informant didn’t mention it) 
 
5.3 Second motivator: discontent with local political conditions of the 
Arkhangelsk region 
The hypothesis that local conditions might affect people’s motivation much in their 
decision to protest is a crucial in the present study. It was underlined earlier that the hypothesis 
is based on the findings of Voznaya and Lankina who define local socioeconomic and political 
conditions as very influential for the nature of protest in the area. The difficulty is that Voznaya 
and Lankina do not designate concretely what kind of socioeconomic and political factors 
affect motivation of people to protest, only saying about “multi-issue nature… of many 
protests” (Voznaya and Lankina, 2015, p. 332). Therefore, in the following paragraphs, through 
the “local political environment” motivator, I try to select out concrete determinants which 
affected (if they did) desire of the Arkhangelsk protesters to be engaged into the 10 December 
rally. 
It should be said in advance: study findings suggest that interviewees often did not 
separate various types of local conditions as motivators form each other. Besides, local 
conditions as motivators might not be viewed apart from nationwide political situation in 
Russia since it affects in more or less degree political and socioeconomic situation inside every 
region. In this sense, separation of local socioeconomic and political factors is done artificially 
just in order to demonstrate clearly what exact local drivers affected people. 
 
5.3.1 Non-competence of local authorities; corruption; bureaucracy 
Informants who reported that bad local political environment was a motivator to 
participate might be divided into two categories: 1) informants who were strongly triggered by 
the local political environment; 2) informants who viewed local political conditions as 
secondary factor for their motivation. 
People in first category emphasized directly that they were triggered by bad political 
environment in Arkhangelsk. Artour, for instance, noted that “[in addition to the election fraud, 
there were] other stimulating factors mainly connected with absolute non-competence of the 
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local politicians, especially, ex-governor; total corruption in bureaucratic machine”38. Such a 
negative attitude, he explained with his experience to build up his own publishing company in 
the city about one year before the December protest. Trying to achieve his aim, Artour stressed 
that local authorities “seemed like… they tried to create barriers” for him and it was the first 
time when he, preparing all necessary documents, “faced famous Russian bureaucracy... with 
total unresposibility and bribing”. He finalized his point that corruption in the local authority 
apparatus resulted in “total lawlessness” in the region. Therefore, by his participation, Artour 
wanted to “make these inactive officials care about their own citizens” and considered that 
great scale of the protest would attract attention from federal centre. As it was mentioned in 
the «Background» chapter, one of the consequences of the Arkhangelsk protest was resignation 
of the governor of the region I. Mikhalchuk39. Such a result of the protest allowed Artour to 
call protest as not “absolutely unsuccessful… like others may say”40. 
Oleg might be also related to the first group. Being concerned with issues regarding 
democracy development in Russia, Oleg, as it was mentioned earlier, prioritized to “restore 
order in [his] own land”41 as a main common aim to protest. Oleg, as a professional politician 
and representative of the opposing political party, noted that he was familiar “from the inside… 
with situation in the local government”. He pointed out that in last years before the protest 
“local authorities, which are obviously consisted mainly of the “United Russia” party 
members, discredited themselves with their activity in the region”. Among other character traits 
of the local Arkhangelsk authority, Oleg stressed “pressure on mass media”, “pressure on local 
opposition”, “comprehensive corruption” and “apartness from regular citizens”. 
“Falsifications of results [in the region] was just another one “merit” of the “United Russia” 
leaders here”42 he continued.  
Second group of informants consists of ones who considered local political factors as 
secondary for their motivation or as ones which were formed under the countrywide political 
situation i.e. dependent on political environment in the state in whole. Anton, as it was said 
above, strictly referred himself to the group of protesters who were involved in solidarity to 
Moscow protest. At the same time, he admitted that in 2011: 
 
                                                          
38 From the interview with Artour 
39 I. Mikhalchuk is a Russian politician; governor of the Arkhangelsk region from 2008 to 2012 
40 From the interview with Artour 




“people evaluated situation in the state through the prism of local experience. In Archangelsk key factor 
was activity of ex-governor I. Mikhalchuk and mayor V. Pavlenko who were members of the “United 
Russia”. I guess corruption in their administration and general worsening of life during their time of 
governance were crucial to people and something that compromised «United Russia» party in the region. 
All that definitely increased my interest in participation” 43 
 
Not recognizing it as a main motivator, he acknowledged that “possibly, it was local 
political situation which made me participate and help in organizing it [protest]… but I cannot 
assess influence of it [corruption in the local government] on myself as a driver adequately”44. 
Thus, Oleg, Artour and Anton might be considered as ones who were affected by 
condition of local political environment in their desire to protest. While Artour and Oleg 
directly connected their motivation with dissatisfaction of political environment in 
Arkhangelsk region, Anton noted that bad condition of political situation in the region was the 
result of bad political environment in general in the state. Anton, therefore, was the one who 
did not view local political situation and political environment in the entire country separately 
from each other. 
 
5.3.2 Distrust to the local civil institutes 
Voznaya and Lankina note that distrust towards civil institutes “gives salience to 
protests as a form of contentious political participation” (Voznaya & Lankina, 2015, p. 329). 
It is connected with the fact that protest, as an “informal form of political participation”, allows 
people to be heard by authorities and express people’s complaints about different aspects of 
governmental policy. It might not be done so effectively by any other form of political 
participation (Wuzumi, 2011). In this sense, protest might serve as a substitute of civil institutes 
in the area where it is hold. This is the reason why in a hybrid regime state people protest more 
than under democracy and totalitarian regimes where these institutes either well developed or 
not developed at all (Ekman, 2009, p. 14). 
The findings indicates that Arkhangelsk protestors were triggered only by discontent 
with work of mass media civil institute. As a main motivator to protest, discontent with work 
of mass media in region was not called by any informant. At the same time, poor conditions of 
civil institutes had rather indirect effect on the protestors. For example, answering my question 
“why you did not appeal to police or sue the organs which extorted a bribe from him”, Artour 
                                                          




replied that “it had no much sense here [in Arkhangelsk] in any case”. He continued that he 
“had [that experience] in my mind when protested in December”45. 
Mostly, if they did at all, informants mentioned dissatisfaction with work of local mass 
media as something they were concerned when protested. “Only at that time I really understood 
that Arkhangelsk newspapers were absolutely pro-state but not pro-people”46 said Katya 
talking about silence in newspapers and local TV news about the election fraud information. 
Not any single interviewee called this factor as a motivator apart from some other ones. Katya 
continued: “of course we were pissed [that local newspapers kept silent about falsifications 
information] but I don’t think that anybody was thinking only about corruptive mass media 
when they went on the square. At the same time, I understood that independent mass media is 
an important part of democracy, democracy which we strived to achieve that day”47. Similar 
vision was followed by Oleg who said that that “freedom of mass media to express their opinion 
openly is a crucial part of democratic state”48. 
Oleg viewed also the problem of corruptive mass media in the city as one which was 
urgent for him while protested. He added, besides, that he knew that in Arkhangelsk there were 
many evidences of how local mass media was “pressured by the local United Russia part 
lobby”. For him, “establishing of fair institute of mass media was in the list of demands” since, 
as a representative of opposing party he was concerned, that his party “got less time and space 
to familiarize voters with our activity… compared to the «United Russia»”49. 
 
 Table 6. Degree of importance of discontent with local political environment in 
Arkhangelsk as a motivator to protest 
 
Pseudonym Discontent with local 
political conditions as 
motivator 
Contributed organizing of 
the protest (“” if yes) 
Julia   
Anton X  
Artour XXX  
Pavel   
Oleg XXX  
Denis   
Katya XX  
Degree of concern: XXX – extremely important for the interviewee; XX – less important; X – least important; 
empty space – not important at all (or informant didn’t mention it) 
                                                          
45 From the interview with Artour 
46 From the interview with Katya 
47 From the interview with Katya 





The findings of the study suggest that local political environment affected motivation 
of protestors to be involved into the rally in 10 December 2011 in Arkhangelsk. To make it 
more demonstrative, Table 6 reflects degree of every interviewee’s concern with political 
environment in the city as a motivator to be engaged in the protest. All in all, based on the 
interviewees’ answers, the following concrete subcategories from this category could be 
selected out: corruption and bureaucracy of the local authorities; discontent with work of the 
Arkhangelsk region governor I. Mikchalchuk and mayor V. Pavlenko;  poor conditions of civil 
institutes in the region (mainly, of inadequate and unfair mass media). 
 Only three of seven interviewees did not consider the present factor as an influencing 
one for them at all, while Artour and Oleg pointed out high importance of this factor for their 
motivation. They both explained that by their personal negative experience of dealing with the 
local political institutes. It is also interesting to note, that both Artour and Oleg considered 
results of the Arkhangelsk protest to be unsuccessful. At the same time, Artour at least called 
resignation of the governor of the region I. Mickhalchuk as positive outcome while Oleg was 
even more pessimistic regarding results of the rally. Oleg connected such a negative view on 
the outcome with little accent on the local problems of the Arkhangelsk region during the 
protest: “I think if the demands of the participants voiced by organizers of the protests were 
“local-minded”… than it [results of the protest] would be more effective”50.  
 Therefore, “local political environment” as a motivator was very influential only for the 
interviewees who personally dealt much with local political institutes and experience was 
negative. Oleg, for example, as a local professional politician underlined that he worked “in 
the Arkhangelsk «political kitchen» for ages and know it from the inside”51. Artour also had 
negative experience with local authorities on his way of business establishing. For the rest of 
informants who had lack of such experience, local political environment factor as a motivator 
to protest was less influential or not important at all. For them, it might be displayed in 
discontent of local mass media or negative perception of the main political leaders (governor 
and mayor) due to their activity lately before the December protest. 
 
                                                          
50 From the interview with Artour 
51 From the interview with Oleg 
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5.4 Third motivator: discontent with local socioeconomic conditions  
In the present paragraph, I am going to discuss how local socioeconomic situation in 
Arkhangelsk affected motivation of my informants to take part in the 10 December protest. It 
is noteworthy that definition of socioeconomic environment might be challenging and viewed 
through the different perspectives (Habitat restoration, n.d.). In my study, I rely on Voznaya 
and Lankina’s view who regard socioeconomic reality in the broad sense including not only 
social and economic experiences but cultural and historical that help mold one's personality, 
attitudes, and lifestyle. Voznaya and Lankina emphasize importance of these factors which, 
according to them, “appear to shape very much… the intensity and the issue dimension of 
regional protest activism” (Voznaya, 2015, p. 340). In other words, socioeconomic situation 
plays crucial role in forming of nature of the protest at the local level. 
Based on the information from my informants, I may view socio-economic situation in 
the Arkhangelsk region as something influential for their motivation to protest from two sides: 
a) influence of history, location and culture of the region on people’s desire to protest; b) 
worsening of living standards as a direct motive to be involved into the rally. 
All of the informants, except Anton, stated that they were stimulated by socioeconomic 
environment in the region one way or another.  
 
5.4.1 Historical, geographical and personality traits of inhabitants in the North 
 Through the specifics of history, location and culture of Arkhangelsk region, the 
informants tried to explain why they were motivated to protest. In other words, they tried to 
explain how local socioeconomic context of the region impacted on their desire to be involved 
into the rally. Therefore, in this paragraph I stress local socio-economic background in the 
region as an important part in forming of people’s motives to protest. 
Several informants connected specific location and history of Arkhangelsk as 
something that might be influential for their desire to protest in December 2011. 
 Julia, trying to explain her activity in the protest, said that “specifics of personal traits 
of northern people, I believe, influenced on me as well”52. She pointed out that “[being a person] 
who had lived in the city more than 30 years… [I] positioned myself as a bearer of traditions 
of Novgorod republic53”. She underlined, that as a local inhabitant, she had some specific 
                                                          
52 From the interview with Julia 
53 Novgorod republic was a proto-democratic Russian medieval state which stretched from the Baltic Sea to the 
northern Ural Mountains between the 12th and 15th centuries. The republic was among the most democratic parts 




northern personal traits: “I think, we still have in our hearts this skepticism to centralization, 
independent mind and strong sense of belonging to this place… we still have that feeling of 
isolation from the centre… in every way”. Consequently, according to Julia, when basic 
democratic freedoms are violated “like it was in 2011, when our freedom to elect was broken… 
people in the north, as heirs of Novgorod republic, perceived violations of their rights very 
acutely”54. It, in its turn, might lead to the big scale of the protest in Arkhangelsk. 
In many respects, specific “northern mentality” as something that affected people to 
express their discontent in the protest, was shared by Oleg. Oleg emphasized that factor of 
northern mentality should not be underestimated when Arkhangelsk protest is discussed. Oleg 
just like Julia marked “intolerance of encroachment on people’s freedom55” as a traditional 
personal trait. Besides, he added “sharp sense of justice” among northern people. “Our internal 
traits do make us react so roughly... and call authorities to responsibility like it was on 
December”56. 
Even Denis, who interconnected his personal motivation to be part of the protest with 
dissatisfaction with political development of Russia in general, admitted at the same time that 
“specifics of mentality of people here [in Arkhangelsk] possibly might explain why there were 
so many protesters in the city, more than in most of the regions in the state, and why they 
expressed their discontent so abundantly”57. Like Julia, Denis pointed out that “northwest 
territories are fatherland of Russian democracy… For us it is very important to have really 
working democratic institutions here”. Therefore, by specifics of mentality in Arkhangelsk, 
Denis explained why people in the North, including him, were so motivated to fight for the 
democracy development in Russia. “We kept inside and endured pressure on democracy in the 
state for a long time and at that day [10 December 2011] we just let everything splash out”58 
summarized Denis. Therefore, for Denis protest was a reaction on democratic institutes’ 
pressure in the country which was expressed mainly by infringement on independence and 
fairness of electoral institute in 2011. 
 In whole, all three informants (Julia, Oleg, Denis) considered specific history of 
northern lands and personal traits of native people as an influential factor for their desire to 
protest. The findings indicate that even if factors which affected people’s motivation are 
referred to the «local socio-economic» group, it does not mean that protestors’ motives were 
                                                          
54 From the interview with Julia 
55 From the interview with Oleg 
56 Ibid. 




based on socioeconomic needs. The study suggests, that specific socioeconomic situation in 
the region (based on the local culture, history and so on) formed individual, peculiar to 
Arkhangelsk residents’, vision of aims and desired results of the protest. Through the prism of 
history of the region, its specific location and personal traits of the local, Julia, Oleg and Denis 
explained, mainly, political nature of the Arkhangelsk protest. All of them noted that specific 
mentality of the native Arkhangelsk inhabitants did not allow them to accept so-called pressure 
on democratic institutes (expressed mainly in violation of electoral process in Russia).  
 
5.4.2 Worsening of standards of living in the region  
 
“You probably now, what is going on around… worsening of life here… This is what made me angry, 
not falsifications”59  
 
The following group of factors is narrower in comparison to the previous one and 
directly connected with socio-economic environment. Standard of living is the level of wealth, 
comfort, material goods and necessities available to a certain socioeconomic class in a certain 
geographic area60 (Investopedia, n.d.). 
All in all, interviewees associated their motivation to participate in the 10 December 
2011 protest with worsening of the standards of living in the city in the last years before the 
studied event. Informants underlined that by 2011 socioeconomic atmosphere in the region had 
become “utterly bad”61. Particularly, Julia said that “[at that time] our region still could not 
overcome the consequences of Great Recession of 2008: whole industrial sector had broken 
down, worsening of ecology, total job cutting everywhere in the region with growing cost of 
living – this is not full list of the problems”62. Similar view was followed by Artour who noted 
that “[corruption in the local authority apparatus] was accompanied with manifestation of 
economic crisis effects [in Arkhangelsk] which pressured all local citizens”63. One of the 
consequences of such bad environment in the city was growth of local people’s discontent 
which became a foundation for the protest mood among inhabitants. N. Chuvashova (2013) 
points out that from 2009 number of small protests started to grow in the Arkhangelsk region, 
most of which touched upon socioeconomic issues: “protest of doctors” in May 2009, “rally 
                                                          
59 From the interview with Pavel 
60 The standard of living includes factors such as income, availability of employment, poverty rate, quality, 
inflation rate, number of vacation days per year, quality of education, life expectancy etc. 
61 From the interview with Artour 
62 From the interview with Julia 
63 From the interview with Artour 
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against monetization of social benefits” in March 2010, “meeting against growth of housing 
tariffs” in February 2011 and other (Chuvashova, 2013, pp. 41-42). Pavel stressed: “after stable 
middle of 2000s people became aware that life in the north could be pretty fine… So, they just 
could not agree that life again getting worse and worse even though most of us [protestors] 
experienced poverty in 1990s”64. 
 Therefore, Pavel summarized, “Arkhangelogorodzy65 logically demonstrated their 
discontent with such situation by protest voting at the Duma elections in 2011 and [when 
people discovered elections fraud] then, by street protest”66. In other words, Julia, Artour and 
Pavel viewed December protest in Arkhangelsk as a part of the protest movement that started 
in 2009 in Arkhangelsk where worsening of living standards was crucial point to protest upon.  
While Artour and Julia considered this factor for them as one of the stimulus to protest, 
for Pavel worsening of life conditions in Arkhangelsk was surely most important inducement. 
As a worker in the Pulp and Paper factory in Arkhangelsk, Pavel said that “we [he and his 
several workmates] wanted to say about our discontent with labour conditions in the factory, 
little wages there and so on”. Possible falsification of election results was secondary for him: 
“I was not so much bothered with electoral falsifications… such things happened everytime as 
I remember”. Unlike Denis and Anton who considered that people tried to express discontent 
with political development of Russia, Pavel “had a perception that many protesters were 
triggered by issues like I was: up-to-the-minute problems based on the fall of living 
standards”67. 
Katya accentuated this factor as a personal motivator to protest as well. At that time, 
she and her relatives were affected by, what she called, “results of socioeconomic stagnation 
in the city”68. Not long ago before protest her father lost the job in the local sawmill. Besides, 
as a last year economist student in the university, she was skeptical about perspectives to find 
job in the city in her field: “…all that altogether made me ask questions to the government. 
That protest was a good possibility for that”69 summarized Katya. Just like for Pavel, 
information that Duma election results might be falsified was something that Katya, as it was 
mentioned earlier, was worried not so much.  
                                                          
64 From the interview with Pavel 
65 “Arkhangelogorozy” is a definition of people who reside in Arkhangelsk  
66 From the interview with Pavel 
67 Ibid. 




The study results indicate that ignorance of such problem as worsening of living 
situation in Arkhangelsk region by central and local authorities affected growth of protest mood 
among inhabitants in Arkhangelsk. Julia, Pavel, Artour mentioned that in 2011 they had a sense 
of being “abandoned by government”70. Julia said, for instance: “Just compare prices for 
groceries in the South and North of Russia! Climate and so on… protest mood is more sensitive 
here due to uncomfortable life conditions. Person feels that state owes him due to difficulty of 
life in the north, but, somehow, state doesn’t care”71. 
 For them and Pavel, worsening of life conditions in the Arkhangelsk region was very 
influential for their desire to be involved into the protest. Significant to mention also, that Julia, 
Katya and Artour mentioned their desire to move from the city to other region of Russia or 
abroad due to “impossibility to realize yourself completely here”72. Such sort of desire suggests 
how dissatisfied people were with socioeconomic situation around. 
 
 Table 7. Degree of importance of discontent with local socioeconomic environment as a 
motivator to protest 
 
Pseudonym Discontent with local 
socioeconomic 
environment as motivator 
Contributed organizing of 
the protest (“—” if yes) 
Julia XX  
Anton   
Artour X   
Pavel XX  
Oleg X  
Denis X  
Katya XXX  
 Degree of concern: XXX – extremely important for the interviewee; XX – less important; X – least important; 
empty space – not important at all (or informant didn’t mention it) 
 
The findings demonstrate that discontent with local socioeconomic environment of the 
Arkhangelsk region affected people’s motivation to be engaged into the 10 December protest. 
As Table 7 demonstrates, almost all of the interviews, in more or less degree, found these 
variable to be important for them. Worsening of the standards of living in the region might be 
identified as an important concrete protest determinant for the informants. What is important 
to note is that informants stressed large role of specific socioeconomic environment of the 
region (manifested in specific history and northern mentality) as something which affected 
                                                          
70 From the interview with Artour 
71 From the interview with Julia 
72 From the interview with Katya 
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their desire to be involved into the December rally. By specific history of the Arkhangelsk 
region and “northern mentality” of local people, informants might explain their reasons to 
participate. For example, Denis and Oleg tried to express mostly their concern with political 
development of the state at the protest i.e. were motivated by drawbacks of political system on 
local or federal level of Russia. However, both of them admitted that specifics of northern 
mentality catalysed their desire to express political claims. 
Besides, as Table 7 displays, ordinary informants were concerned with local 
socioeconomic environment more than ones participial to the organizers of the Arkhangelsk 
protest (Anton, Oleg, Denis). It might explain why, as protest researcher N. Chuvashova points 
out, the resolution after the Arkhangelsk protest contained only political demands 
(Chuvashova, 2013, p. 44). Such a “gap” between organizers and regular protesters was also 
noticed by Artour and Pavel. The latter additionally explained why the Arkhangelsk protest 
resolution was factually ignored by authorities: “If ones who were answerable [at the protest] 
included concrete demands based on improvement of socioeconomic situation here instead of 
abstract things like «liberalisation of electoral law», I believe… authorities would listen to 
them and, perhaps, solve some”73. 
 
5.5 Summary  
In this chapter, I have presented and analysed the field narratives. Research results 
indicate that informants were motivated by all three motivators selected in chapter 3: 1) 
discontent with general political situation in the country; 2) discontent with local political 
environment in the Arkhangelsk region and 3) discontent with local socioeconomic 
environment. 
 
Table 8. Degree of importance of all motivators to protest 
 
Pseudonym Protest motivators Contributed 
organizing of 
the protest 














Julia XXX  XX  
Anton XXX X   
Artour X XXX X  
Pavel X  XX  
                                                          
73 From the interview with Artour 
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Oleg XXX XXX X  
Denis XXX  X  
Katya X XX XXX  
Degree of concern: XXX – extremely important for the interviewee; XX – less important; X – least important; 
empty space – not important at all (or informant didn’t mention it) 
 
The findings suggest that the following concrete subcategories in these motivators 
might be identified: 
Motivator 1: Discontent with political system of Russia: a) duma election fraud; b) 
irremovability of leading federal politicians; corruption; bad quality of governing; c) poor 
conditions of political legislation regarding electoral process. 
Motivator 2: Discontent with local political environment in Arkhangelsk region: 
a) corruption and bureaucracy of the local authorities; b) discontent with work of key 
politicians in the Arkhangelsk region (mayor, governor); c) distrust to the local civil institutes 
(discontent with functioning of regional Mass media). 
Motivator 3: Discontent with local socioeconomic environment: a) worsening of 
standards of living in the region; b) specific historical place of Arkhangelsk region; northern 
mentality. 
The first category “discontent with political situation in Russia in general” includes the 
following concrete determinants which were important for my informants while they protested: 
information that election results might be falsified; irremovability of leading politicians and 
corruption in the central authorities, poor conditions of political legislation regarding electoral 
process (f.e. difficulty to register new parties). The second category “discontent with local 
political environment in Arkhangelsk region” includes corruption and bureaucracy of the local 
authorities; discontent with work of key politicians in the Arkhangelsk region; distrust to the 
local civil institutes. The issues from the third category “discontent with local socioeconomic 
environment”, which were important for the protestors, are following: specific historical place 
of Arkhangelsk region; northern mentality; worsening of standards of living in the region. 
In the Table 8, I have collected and classified the answers of the informants altogether 
in one place. This table clearly demonstrates that discontent with political situation in Russia 
in general was an important driver which made people go on the rally in Arkhangelsk. As it 
was mentioned in the first chapter, the assumption that the local problems of the city were most 
significant in formation of protestors’ motivation was crucial in the thesis. The findings, 
however, may not prove such a categorical assumption. At the same time, it is patently 
noticeable from the Table 8 that local conditions affected people’s motivation to get involved 
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into the rally as well. As A. Voznaya and T. Lakina (2015) note, this uniqueness of the local 
environments “results in varied protest configurations… across the country” (Voznaya, 2015, 
p. 340) i.e. makes protest specific in comparison to other ones in other regions. Therefore, the 
view on the December protest in Arkhangelsk as a “small copy” (Shishkina, 2013, p. 379) of 
the Moscow one, where people were motivated by same to Moscow protesters issues is not 
completely right. Moreover, for some of the interviewees, claims associated with local 
environment of Arkhangelsk were even more important. To be acknowledged, I did not expect 
that the protestors in Arkhangelsk were so concerned with general political problems of the 
state while protested.  
It should be added also that ordinary protesters viewed the December rally in 
Arkhangelsk as an arena to express various types of claims: one person could be concerned 
with local socioeconomic issues and problems of political development of Russia at the same 
time. Important to note, that specific northern mentality and history of the Arkhangelsk region 
might influence desire to express discontent on the protest although it should not be viewed as 
a motivator literally. Views of the informants who helped with organisation of the Arkhangelsk 
protest were less various and focused mainly on political demands (both local and general).  
Such a big set of issues, which motivated the informants, may indicate that the 
December protest in the city should be viewed in complex. It might possibly explain why the 
Arkhangelsk protest was the biggest in the history of the city in last decades: “in December 
2011 there was a good combination, from one side, of bad socio-economic situation, from the 
other, authority in all levels compromised itself hard. So all that led to such scale of the 
movement…”74.  
In relation to the Voznaya and Lankina’s theory, results of the research indicate that 10 
December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk had traits of political, legal and socio-economic types 
of the protest (Voznaya & Lankina, 2015, p. 332). It is difficult to argue how far I can apply 
obtained data based on sample of 7 people and generalize results of the study in regards to the 
whole Arkhangelsk protest. What should be noted, however, is that sample represents typical 
protester of that time: young, well-educated people which might give some foundation to make 
at least provisional conclusion on that score. Finally, it is important to mention, that strong 
discontent of the Arkhangelsk protesters regarding development of civil and political institutes 
on federal and local level suggests about strong presence of traits of hybrid regime state in 
Russia. 
                                                          
74 From the interview with Artour 
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Chapter 6. Summary and concluding remarks 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The thesis has sought to answer the question what motivated people to take part in the 
10 December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk. It was an attempt to provide individual perspectives 
of people involved into the December protest in the city. The research has been based on seven 
qualitative semi-structured interviews. To explain people’s motives to participate in the protest, 
theory of spatial analyses of protest under the hybrid regime has been chosen. This theory 
emphasizes local socioeconomic and political conditions as influential factors in formation of 
nature of protest i.e. in formation of people’s demands towards authorities. Thus, local 
socioeconomic and local political environment were chosen as protest motivators through 
which I tried to find out what concretely motivated Arkhangelsk protestors. Since the formal 
cause of all December protests across Russia was dissatisfaction with current political system 
of the state (manifested, first of all, in Duma election fraud), discontent with general political 
state of Russia was chosen as a motivator as well. 
A note on limitations 
The number of the earlier studies regarding 10 December protest in Arkhangelsk is 
extremely small. Additionally, that rally was never studied from the perspectives of protesters 
earlier at all while in this study protestors’ reflection was a cornerstone of the work. As it was 
mentioned, it is rather challenging to reason how far the results of the research based on 
narratives of seven informants can be applied. It is absolutely clear that I cannot generalize 
mostly results I have received upon all protestors of the Arkhangelsk rally and make overall 
conclusion regarding the protest. At the same time, my first priority task was to give 
presentation of concrete motivators which affected small group of people to protest. Making 
my conclusions, I tried not to go beyond limitations of my sample. 
 
6.2 Findings 
Modern Russia might be considered as a hybrid regime state (intermediate state 
between authoritarian and democratic state) (Wuzumi, 2011). In such state role of protest as 
form of political participation is extremely high since formal institutional channels of authority-
citizens “communication” (such as electoral institute, competitive multiparty system and other) 
work ineffectively or/and are not trusted. Based on that, it could be assumed that the 10 
December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk might not be directly connected with desire to express 
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discontent with nationwide political system but with an opportunity to air grievances connected 
with local social, economic, political environments as well. 
The analyses of the field narratives has demonstrated that all three motivators affected 
Arkhangelsk protesters’ motivation to go on the 10 December rally. Together with concrete 
influencing on motivation subcategories which are selected out from these motivators, they are 
gathered in the Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Arkhangelsk protest variables and determinants 
 
Protest motivator Subcategory 
Discontent with political system of Russia 1) Duma election fraud 
2) Irremovability of leading federal 
politicians; corruption; bad quality of 
governing 
3) Poor conditions of political legislation 
regarding electoral process (f.e. difficulty to 
register new parties) 
Discontent with local political environment 
in Arkhangelsk region   
1) Corruption and bureaucracy of the local 
authorities 
2) Discontent with work of key politicians 
in the Arkhangelsk region (mayor, 
governor) 
3) Poor conditions of civil institutes 
(discontent with functioning of regional 
Mass media) 
Discontent with local socioeconomic 
environment  
1) Worsening of standards of living in the 
region  
2) Specific historical place of Arkhangelsk 
region; northern mentality 
 
Every informant marked discontent with general political system in Russia as an 
important motivator to be involved into the protest. Possible information that election results 
might be falsified was, as a rule, first thing which touched protestors. However, the empirical 
findings evidence that protestors had other, no less important motivators based on discontent 
with Russian political system in addition. Informants expressed their dissatisfaction with 
irremovability of top political leaders (V. Putin and his surrounding), corruption among federal 
politicians, overwhelming bureaucracy; rigorousness and inadequacy of the legislation 
regarding electoral process. All in all it means that they were really concerned with democracy 
development in Russia, its state and perspectives. 
Informants who contributed in organisation of the 10 December 2011 protest in 
Arkhangelsk were triggered by this motivator more than ordinary participants. It is connected 
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generally with their common vision of the protest as an expression of liberal democratic claims 
of middle class towards authorities. Not surprisingly, that the resolution written by organizers 
after the Arkhangelsk protest contained only general political claims like it was in Moscow and 
included: resignation of the involved into the fraud politicians, liberalization of electoral law, 
new elections in Duma and so on. In whole, Arkhangelsk protesters’ claims based on discontent 
with general political system of Russia are, in many ways, similar to the claims of protestors 
from the December 2011 protest in Moscow which are shown in the “Theoretical foundation” 
chapter. Based on experiences of my informants, thus, some of the Arkhangelsk protestors were 
really motivated by similar issues as protestors in Moscow. 
Besides, it is rather easy to notice that demands based on the first motivator reflects, in 
many respects, drawbacks of so-called hybrid regime state. In particular, subcategories of the 
first motivator correspond to the following traits of hybrid regime state presented in Table 10:  
 
Table 10. Hybrid regime state traits and motives to protest75 
 
Theory: traits of hybrid regime Findings: informants’ motives to protest 
Lack of governmental accountability/strong-
man leadership / clientism 
Irremovability of leading federal politicians 
Lack of  trust in formal democratic 
institutions 
Distrust to the Duma election results 
High level of corruption Corruption; bad quality of governing 
Lack of forms of political participation 
 
Poor conditions of political legislation 
regarding electoral process 
   
It is difficult to argue how far I can generalize such results of the research. However, 
curious linkage between my informants’ motives and traits of the hybrid regime is clear in this 
study. It may give some foundation to summarize that the Arkhangelsk protest was partly a 
reaction of people on weaknesses of such regime which is peculiar to modern Russia. 
 Through the lens of “Local political environment in Arkhangelsk region” motivator I 
have found out three subcategories which affected my informants’ motivation to participate. 
As it is noted in the Table 9, they are as follows: corruption and bureaucracy of the local 
authorities; discontent with work of crucial politicians in the Arkhangelsk region (mayor and 
governor); distrust to the local civil institutes. Five of seven informants stressed influence of 
these factors on their desire to be involved in the December rally in Arkhangelsk. Especially 
                                                          




big concern was demonstrated by the informants who had large personal negative experience 
of dealing with local political institutes (f.e. due to work in the local government or due to large 
contacts with representative of local authorities on the way of business establishing). If the 
informants had lack of such sort of experience, their concern was less manifested. 
 Furthermore, it is rather easy to notice from the Table 9 that subcategories form the first 
and second motivators, to some extent, coincide with each other. It could be said that 
subcategories from the “discontent with local political enivronment” category are similar to the 
claims regarding general political situation of Russia but wrapped into the local context. In the 
table 11 I try to draw parallels between protestors’ discontent with general political situation 
in the state and discontent with local political environment. 
 
Table 11. Intersection of political discontent at local and federal levels76 
 
Discontent with general political 
environment 
Discontent with local political 
environment 
Discontent with work of federal crucial 
leaders:  
a) president D. Medvedev, 
b) prime-minister V. Putin,  
c) chief of Electoral commission V. Churov 
Discontent with work of the local crucial 
politicians:  
a) governor I. Mikhalchuk,  
b) mayor V. Pavlenko 
Discontent with corruption in federal 
authorities 
Discontent with corruption in local 
authorities 
Discontent with some federal laws 
(particularly, with legislation regarding 
electoral process) 
Discontent with some local laws (f.e. 
regarding development of business in 
Arkhangelsk) 
Discontent with work of federal civil 
institutions: mass media, Central Electoral 
Commission  
Discontent with work of local mass media 
 
Such a crossing of political claims expressed in the protest might suggest that 
“hybridity” was peculiar not only to Russia as the state in whole, but to the concrete region in 
particular. It is difficult to show how federal political environment may affect political 
environment at regional level (and vice versa). It is clear, however, that if political system of 
the state in general has some problems it is rather difficult to avoid similar problems on the 
local level. It might explain why similarity of some political determinants on both levels which 
motivated people to protest is so noticeable. 
Six of seven informants marked that discontent with local socioeconomic environment 
affected their motivation to protest. The main subcategory under this category is a “worsening 
                                                          
76 Based on the narratives of the interviewees 
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of standards of living in the region”. For informants, this subcategory included: dissatisfaction 
with job perspectives in the region, worsening of ecology, growing cost of living, poor 
infrastructure etc. Due to this, several informants felt themselves vulnerable and abandoned by 
authorities of both local and federal levels. By expressing discontent with socioeconomic 
situation in the region, informants, therefore, wanted to attract attention of authorities to the 
problem of existence in the north. Furthermore, the findings of the research suggest that this 
motivator was more influential to the ordinary informants in comparison to the ones 
contributing to organisation. This, perhaps, might explain why, as it was mentioned earlier, the 
resolution after the Arkhangelsk protest did not include any demands based on local 
socioeconomic condition of the region. 
“Specific historical place of Arkhangelsk region and northern mentality” as a 
subcategory of third motivator should be stressed especially. Informants noted, that 
singularities of the regional history, of personal traits of native people, formed individual 
peculiar to Arkhangelsk residents’ vision of the December protest in general. In particular, 
through this subcategory, some interviewees explained why the protest in the city was so big. 
This subcategory should be viewed not as a separate motivator but as something what affected 
desire to protest on the whole. Mainly by specifics of history and personality in the north 
informants explained political nature of the Arkhangelsk protest. For example, protestors might 
feel especially violated because of the possible falsifications of the Duma election results. 
Finally, informants most often noted that they were motivated by several motivators at 
once (see Table 8). These motivators might smoothly flow out from each other and be even 
similar-type ones. Since protestors sometimes might not separate them one from another I had 
to do it by myself just to make influencing motivators clear and visible for the research. 
However, in their answers, the ordinary protestors were different a little compared to the ones 
who help with protest organization. The latter were more concerned with political issues (local 
and federal), while influence of socioeconomic environment was more significant for ordinary 
protestors. Study suggests that age and education difference can be hardly connected with 
difference of motives which informants were concerned upon.   
The findings of the thesis suggest that combination of different sort of protest 
subcategories affected protestors’ motivation to participate which, in turn, might mean that 
nature of Arkhangelsk protest was complex. Therefore, such sort of cliché as “small copy of 
Moscow protest” (Shishkina, 2013, p. 379) regarding protest in Arkhangelsk is unacceptable 




Summing up, Arkhangelsk protestors expressed nationwide similar to other regions’ 
discontent with general political development of Russia. However even vision of general 
political problems of Russia might be very specific among Arkhangelsk protestors due to 
influence of local environments. As it was noted in the “Theoretical foundation” chapter, 
Northern European regions of Russia (including the Arkhangelsk region) have usually more 
developed democratic institutions in their area in comparison to the rest of the country. 
Empirical findings proves this point in many respects: protestors often mentioned specific 
historically formed mentality and personality traits of Arkhangelsk people which made them 
perceive violations regarding democracy in the state especially much.  Being dissatisfied with 
trends of returning to authoritarian regime in general and the election fraud in particular, 
Arkhangelsk protestors might protest, perhaps, due to mismatch of their desires and vision of 
democracy in Russia and real situation in the state. All that accompanied with concrete set of 
local political and socioeconomic problems might explain why that protest was one of the 
biggest in city’s history. 
 
6.3 Analytical contributions and suggestions for further research   
The present thesis was one of the first works where findings of Voznay and Lankina 
were applied to the concrete case: December 2011 protest in Arkhangelsk. Voznaya and 
Lankina tried to find out common trends of the protests in Russia from 2007 to 2012. I used 
one of their findings in regards to the Arkhangelsk rally. In particular, their hypothesis that 
local political and socioeconomic environments might be influential in forming of people’s 
protest demands. Voznaya and Lankina did not find out concrete determinants which affected 
people’ motivation to protest. In the present research, identification of these determinants was 
most crucial part of the work. 
Analytically, this study has sought to contribute to understanding of possible nature of 
the 10 December protest in Arkhangelsk. All in all, using information from the informants’ 
narratives and protest typology of T. Voznaya and A. Lankina, Arkhangelsk protest contained 
traits of political, legal and socio-economic types of the protest (Lankina & Voznaya, 2015, p. 
332).  
In the future, research can be continued in different directions. For example, it is 
possible to find out the motives of protesters in December 2011 from other regions through the 
same motivators and make a comparison with Arkhangelsk protestors’ motives. The history of 
modern Russia manifests that wave of protest emerged after every Duma election in the state 
(in more or less degree). Therefore, after the Duma election 2016, if the country again 
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undergoes the protest wave, it will be possible to conduct analogical to the present study and 
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Appendix 1. Interview guide 
 
The aim: to find out why informants decided to get involved into the 10 December 
2011 protest in Arkhangelsk, Russia. 
 
Block I. General information regarding interviewee: 
- age; 
- gender; 
- level of education and occupation; 
- role in the protest (ordinary participant, organizer, contributor to organizing etc.) 
 
Block II. Precondition of the protest:  
a) 2011 Duma elections were the first one after the “United Russia” took the office in 
2001 when number of supporters, according to results, decreased much in many regions of 
Russia compared to the previous elections. Besides, despite this, wave of protest occurred 
across entire Russia. In your opinion, what is the reason for that? 
b) Why such a big scale of protest across Russia emerged right at that time: not earlier 
or later? 
 
Block III. Peculiarities of Northh European Russia. Arkhangelsk region 
a) In Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Karelia regions number of supporters of the “Untied 
Russia” and federal leaders in general decreased even more in comparison to other regions of 
the state. Why did such situation occur in these regions? 
b) One of the biggest protest (excluding Moscow and St. Petersburg) against results 
also happened in the European North of Russia. Why here? What’s the peculiarity of the 
northwest region of Russia? 
 
Block IV. Interviewee’s vision of nature of the 10 December protest in 
Arkhangelsk 
a) Could you describe mood and atmosphere in society in Arkhangelsk right before the 
December events? 
b) What were your own motives to take part in? Did they coincide with official aims of 
the protest declared in the organization group in VK.com? 
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c) Did you contribute to organization of the protest? If you did, could you say more 
about that experience 
d) Did you go with company or alone? What sort of people were in the protest? 
e) Were you satisfied with results? Or your expectations were not met? 
 
Block V. Summary: influence and consequences 
a) Could that meeting be called as a part of democratization process in Russia or not?  
If not, how would you call that protest in two words? 
b) Was the protest influential on you in any way? How? 
c) In near future, is it possible that some sort of similar protest occur In Arkhangelsk 
like it was in 2011? For example, after next elections in 2016. If yes, are you going to take part 
in it? 
 
 
